




According to Veritism, true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Epistemol-
ogists often take Veritism to entail that all other epistemic items can only have value
by standing in certain instrumental relations—viz., by tending to produce a high ratio
of true to false beliefs or by being products of sources with this tendency. Yet many
value theorists outside epistemology deny that all derivative value is grounded in instru-
mental relations to fundamental value (‘Instrumentalism’). Veritists, I believe, can and
should follow suit. After setting the stage in §1, I explain in §2 why Veritism should
not take an Instrumentalist form. Instrumentalist Veritism faces a generalized version of
the swamping problem. But this problem undermines Instrumentalism, not Veritism:
granting Instrumentalism, similar problems arise for any economical epistemic axiol-
ogy. I show in §3 how Veritism can take a less narrow form and solve the swamping
problem. After answering some objections in §4, I consider what some would regard a
less radical alternative solution and argue that it either fails or collapses into mine. I close
in §5 by taking stock and re-evaluating the overall prospects for Veritism, suggesting that
it is a highly promising epistemic axiology when divorced from Instrumentalism.
1 Introduction
‘[T]he proper appreciation of a beautiful object is a good thing,’ wrote G. E. Moore (1903,
Ch. VI, §114). Yet while beauty and its proper appreciation are both good, it is implausible
that they are equally fundamental goods. Appreciating beauty is good only because beauty
is good. After all, it is only good to appreciate what merits appreciation. Appreciating trash
is no good. So, although it is valuable, the appreciation of beauty seems to have a derivative
kind of value.
This is an example of a more general fact. In any evaluative domain, some values are
more fundamental than others, in the sense that the value of everything else in the domain
is explained by their value. So, for any domain, we can ask the Fundamentality Question:
(FQ) Which value or set of values is the most fundamental in the domain?
Ethicists have long addressed FQ as it arises in the practical domain. Epistemologists have
recently taken interest in FQ as it arises in the epistemic domain. There are, after all, many
epistemic values: accuracy, rationality, justification, coherence, knowledge, etc. But it is
doubtful that they are equally fundamental. We admire some of them from the epistemic
point of view because we admire others from the epistemic point of view.
So, which is fundamental? Many have found it attractive to think that truth is at the
bottom of it all. For many items we value from the epistemic point of view, it is plausible
that we value them because we value accurate belief. Inspired by this idea, one might favor:
(Veritism) Accurate belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value.
Many epistemologists have accepted Veritism, though it finds considerable opposition in
recent literature. I also accept the view. But I think opponents and proponents alike under-
stand it in an unjustifiably narrow way. Veritism is defensible if and only if it is understood
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less narrowly. The aim of this paper is to explain and defend this claim.
The Narrow Assumption: Instrumentalism about Derivative Value. Many epistemol-
ogists assume that there is only one kind of way in which we can explain one epistemic
value in terms of a more fundamental epistemic value. The explanation, they assume, must
proceed by invoking instrumental relations, so that for any X, X is derivatively epistemically
good only by (i) tending to produce fundamental epistemic goods or (ii) being the product
of something with feature (i).1 Call the kind of value something has just in virtue of (i)
production value, and the kind something has just in virtue of (ii) mere product value. More
officially, then, many assume:
(Instrumentalism about Derivative Epistemic Value) All derivative epistemic value is
either production value or mere product value.
As a result, many assume that Veritism is trivially equivalent to:
(Instrumentalist Veritism) Accurate belief is the sole non-instrumental epistemic value.
None of this is trivial, however. Many value theorists have rejected Instrumentalism, in-
cluding some who are consequentialists about rightness. Accordingly, it is only natural to
wonder whether Veritism can take a less narrow form.
What could derivative value be, if not instrumentally grounded value? The example
with which I opened provides one illustration. Appreciating beauty is good because beauty
is good. But this ‘because’ signals no instrumental relation. Appreciating beauty does not re-
liably cause more beauty to exist, and needn’t be the product of anything beauty-conducive.
Luckily, we are not forced to appeal to instrumental relations. On a more natural model,
the instance of appreciation derives value because (a) its intentional object is good and (b) it
is a proper way to value that good object. The result is appealing: appreciating beauty seems
parasitically but also non-instrumentally good.
Here is another way to understand what is going on. For X’s value to be explained by
Y’s, X must stand in some relation to Y. Call such relations value derivation relations. In-
strumental relations comprise one species of value derivation relations. But not the only
species. In the case of beauty and its appreciation, the relation that mediates the derivation
is not any instrumental relation but rather the relation of being a way to value.
Hurka’s Principle. Ethicists have constructed axiologies that honor this idea. Thomas
Hurka, for example, defends a recursive account on which there are basic non-instrumental
values such as beauty and pleasure, and a principle for grounding derivative non-instrumental
values in the basic ones:
(Hurka’s Principle) When V is a non-instrumental value, proper ways of valuing V
have some derivative non-instrumental value.2
1One might reserve ‘instrumental epistemic value’ for (i). But I use it to capture the kind of derivative value
that something has just by standing in some instrumental relation. The product of relation is just as much an
instrumental relation as the caused by relation is a causal relation. Since many epistemologists allow that (ii) can
ground derivative epistemic value, it is only fair to define Instrumentalism this way.
2See Hurka (2001). Hurka uses a less general version of this principle which mentions love rather than ways
of valuing. But that principle is, I take it, plausible because love is a proper way of valuing the good.
Is the principle trivial because ‘proper’ and ‘valuable’ are synonyms? No: propriety and value are distinct
normative categories. The principle also says proper ways of valuing are derivatively valuable, not just valuable.
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Given this principle, Hurka suggests that consequentialists about rightness can embrace the
non-instrumental value of virtue while also respecting the thought that virtue has only a
parasitic kind of value. They can do so by identifying virtues with ways of valuing more
fundamental values and by making use of Hurka’s Principle. Hurka’s model is not the only
one in value theory that rejects Instrumentalism. Other axiologists reject it.3 I highlight
Hurka’s view because it inspires my own.
Before proceeding, I want to make some clarifications about how I understand Hurka’s
Principle. Firstly, I construe ‘valuing’ broadly, to include any way of being positively ori-
ented toward something in attitude, act, or disposition. I do not have in mind the narrow
sense that contrasts with first-order desiring.4 As examples of valuing in this broad sense, I
would include everything picked out by Nozick’s ‘V verbs’ and more, which include:
maintaining, saving from destruction, prizing, contemplating, [...] car[ing] about, ac-
cept[ing], support[ing], affirm[ing], encourag[ing], protect[ing], guard[ing], prais[ing],
seek[ing], embrac[ing], serv[ing], be[ing] drawn toward, be[ing] attracted by, as-
pir[ing] toward, striv[ing] to realize, foster[ing], express[ing], nurtur[ing], delight[ing]
in, respect[ing], be[ing] inspired by, tak[ing] joy in, resonat[ing] with, be[ing] loyal
to, be[ing] dedicated to, and celebrat[ing]. (Nozick 1984, p. 429)
This broad understanding fits both with the way proponents of Hurka’s Principle intend it
and with the core intuitions that support it. While Hurka uses the narrow-sounding ‘love’
to express his principle, he is clear that he intends this word to be understood unusually
broadly, so that mere desiring counts as loving.5 Similarly, Adams talks about ‘being for’
the good, and counts as ways of being for the good many of the phenomena on Nozick’s list
(Adams 2006, pp. 15–16). It is sensible, I believe, to understand the principle this broadly.
While it might be better to value the good in a strong sense that implies higher-order en-
dorsement, even mere first-order aiming at the good is somewhat non-instrumentally good.
Consider Huck Finn, who is motivated by a desire to help Jim that he rejects as wrong at
the higher order.6
Hurka’s Principle is hence very general. I think it is natural to generalize it in further
ways that will matter in what follows. To see another plausible generalization, note that it is
not only ways of valuing (e.g., love) but also actions and attitudes that manifest them (e.g.,
loving treatment) that have derivative non-instrumental value.
By way of illustration, suppose Alice peforms a beneficent act that manifests her valuing
of beneficence, while Beatrice performs the same kind of act as a PR stunt. Alice’s act has
greater worth than Beatrice’s, and this extra worth is not merely instrumental. But the fact
that Alice’s act has greater worth is not just a brute fact. It has a two-stage explanation: (i)
Alice’s act has greater worth by manifesting real valuing of beneficence, and (ii) this valuing,
in turn, is good because it is fittingly directed at something good. So, we should extend the
principle to say:
When V is a non-instrumental value, fitting ways of valuing V and their manifestations
have some derivative non-instrumental value.
3See Anderson (1993), Herman (1993), Kagan (1999), Korsgaard (1983), Moore (1903), Parfit (2011), Rabi-
nowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen (1999), Rashdall (1907), Scanlon (1998), and Zimmerman (2001).
4The restricted sense of ‘valuing’, which is admittedly often salient when we use the term in ordinary lan-
guage, came into prominence in action theory after Watson (1975), and played an important role in discussions
of subjectivism about value by Lewis (1989), Harman (1993), and Smith (1994).
5Note Hurka’s gloss: ‘To ‘love’ x is to be positively oriented toward x in one’s desires, actions, or feelings, or,
more generally, in one’s attitudes’ (2003, p. 14).
6Cf. Arpaly (2003).
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One further extension will prove important. Like Sosa (2007), I will only be assuming that
accuracy, knowledge, rationality, etc., have value from the epistemic point of view. So, I am
only interested in defending a version of Veritism on which accuracy is the sole fundamental
value from the epistemic point of view. It is compatible with this view that accuracy might
have no non-instrumental value from any non-epistemic point of view. Thus, I need the
principle that if V-ing is a fitting way of valuing a non-instrumental value from the point of
view of a domain D, V-ing has derivative non-instrumental value in D.
This extended principle is no less plausible than the original. Even if beauty isn’t non-
instrumentally valuable simpliciter, it is non-instrumentally valuable from the aesthetic point
of view. So is the appreciation of beauty: this is also a good thing from the aesthetic point of
view, since it is an aesthetically fitting response.7 But the latter has a derivative status relative
to the former. So, we should revise the principle in one further way:
(The Extended Hurka Principle) When V is a non-instrumental value from the point of
view of domain D, fitting ways of valuing V in D and their manifestations have some
derivative non-instrumental value in D.
A Caption of the View and the Plan. My view appeals to the Extended Hurka Principle to
explain why rational belief, justified belief, and knowledge have an accuracy-oriented kind
of epistemic worth. Such beliefs are epistemically valuable because they manifest certain
ways to value accuracy in thought. The view is compatible with many substantive pictures
of the nature of rationality, justification, knowledge, and other epistemic desiderata. I see
the best pictures as simply disagreeing about what it takes to value accuracy in thought.
My view is that any way of valuing accuracy in believing P involves a disposition to hold
a belief in P only if it is likely accurate relative to the epistemic reasons. There are several
ways to value accuracy in thought because there are several kinds of likelihood and epistemic
reasons, corresponding to different epistemic desiderata. These ways and the corresponding
desiderata qualify as derivatively epistemically good thanks to the ExtendedHurka Principle.
With this capsule statement in mind, here is the plan. In §2, I explain why Veritism
should not be identified with Instrumentalist Veritism. Instrumentalist Veritism faces a
generalized version of the swamping problem. But this problem undermines Instrumental-
ism, not Veritism. Granting Instrumentalism, similar problems arise for any economical
epistemic axiology. I show in §3 how Veritism can take a less narrow form and solve the
swamping problem. After answering some objections in §4, I consider what some would
regard as a successful and less radical alternative solution—the solution offered by virtue
epistemologists—and argue that it either fails or collapses into mine. I close in §5 by taking
stock and re-evaluating the overall prospects for Veritism. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to establish that Veritism is hands-down superior to every alternative epistemic
axiology, I suggest that Veritism renews its promise when divorced from Instrumentalism.
Disclaimers. Before moving on, let me make some remarks about what I’m not doing.
Denying Instrumentalism is compatible with affirming that some derivative epistemic values
are purely instrumental. Reliable types of processes have significant instrumental epistemic
value, and reliabilists are right to place value on them. I don’t deny these claims.
Denying Instrumentalism is also compatible with the idea that some items might have
both instrumental epistemic value and a different kind of derivative epistemic value. Being
7Of course, it sounds weird to say that the appreciation of beauty is aesthetically good. But the problem is
terminological: since appreciation is an aesthetically fitting response to beauty, it is certainly a good thing from
the aesthetic point of view. This is why I use the ‘point of view’ talk, which is more general.
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instrumental to accuracy, I agree, is a necessary condition for some epistemic virtues. I only
deny that Instrumentalism can explain all the facts about derivative epistemic value.
Furthermore, I am not arguing in this paper against reliabilism. Reliabilism is a thesis
about the nature of justified belief or—in some permutations—knowledge. Instrumentalism
is a thesis about how derivative epistemic value is grounded in fundamental epistemic value.
Reliabilism does not entail this thesis. Indeed, reliabilism does not by itself entail any claims
about the worth that any beliefs possess from the epistemic point of view. One would
need to appeal to auxiliary assumptions about epistemic worth and the relationship between
derivative and fundamental epistemic worth to draw any such conclusions.
Many have worried that reliabilists can only appeal to an Instrumentalist model of deriva-
tive epistemic value. But I think this is wrong: there are sophisticated forms of reliabilism
that are not forced to accept a purely Instrumentalist model. Admittedly, I will discuss a
simple form of reliabilism when I introduce the generalized swamping problem for Instru-
mentalism in the next section. But this is only as a nod to the literature.
Finally, my focus is on epistemic value. Here I will not defend a non-consequentialist
view about epistemic rightness. Indeed, Hurka’s view was intended to provide a way for
consequentialists about ethical rightness to consistently uphold the non-instrumental value
of virtue. By accepting a richer axiology, consequentialists can uphold a less revisionary
account of our duties. This idea is old, found in ideal consequentialists of the early 20th
century like Hastings Rashdall and G. E. Moore. While I do reject consequentialism about
epistemic rightness, this paper is not an argument against it.8
2 Instrumentalism and the Swamping Problem
Why should Veritists reject Instrumentalism? A large reason is that this is the best way to
solve a generalized version of the swamping problem. To bring this out, I will rehearse the
original swamping problem and explain why we should still take it seriously. I will then
explain why it undermines Instrumentalist Veritism. But I’ll argue that the Instrumentalist
half is the culprit: anymodest epistemic axiology that embraces Instrumentalism faces a rela-
tive of the swamping problem, and Veritists can easily avoid it by rejecting Instrumentalism.
2.1 The Old Problem (and Why It Remains Important)
Originally, the swamping problem was presented as a problem for a simple kind of relia-
bilism. The following thoughts prompted the problem. The epistemic value of a reliable
belief-forming process per se is just instrumental epistemic value relative to the goal of pro-
ducing true beliefs. While reliable belief-forming processes have great epistemic value, one
also wants to evaluate their products. And unfortunately, the following claim is plausible:
(A) A belief’s having been produced by a reliable belief-forming process does not as such
make that belief epistemically better if that belief is already true.
(A) is made plausible by an analogy from Zagzebski (1999). The mere fact that some good
coffee was produced by a reliable coffeemaker does not make that coffee better. But a reliably
produced true belief as such is analogous to a reliably produced cup of good coffee. Thus:
(B) If knowledge = true belief produced by a reliable belief-forming process, then knowl-
edge is not as such epistemically better than true belief.
8See Berker (2013) for an argument against consequentialism about epistemic rightness.
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But knowledge is as such epistemically better than true belief. Hence the problem.
Some might try to resist this argument by observing that we do sometimes place greater
value on products of reliable sources.9 For example, the market value of a good watch
produced by Rolex would be far higher than that of a qualitatively identical watch produced
by Casio. Doesn’t this undermine the swamping argument?
No. Intuition pumps like this do support the conclusion that some products of reliable
sources are better than intrinsically similar products of unreliable sources. But this conclu-
sion does not undermine the reasoning behind the swamping problem. Here is why. The
key thought behind the swamping argument is this:
(*) Being produced by a reliable producer of good Fs cannot as suchmake a good F better.
The ‘as such’ matters. It is consistent with (*) that other properties can contingently ac-
company a good F’s reliable ancestry and add value to that F. The Rolex/Casio example is
an illustration: Rolexes are status symbols and have a higher resale value. That is why the
Rolex is preferable. If it lacked these properties, preferring it would be irrational.
Proponents of the swamping argument will agree that reliably produced good Fs are
sometimes better than unreliably produced good Fs. Zagzebski (1996) agrees that reliability
is a necessary condition for complete epistemic virtue.10 Thus, she agrees that some reliably
produced true beliefs are better than mere true beliefs: some reliably produced true beliefs
will satisfy the other necessary conditions for manifesting complete epistemic virtue, after
all! What Zagzebski and others deny is that reliable ancestry as such is sufficient to explain
why knowledge as such is epistemically better.
That was the problem all along. So, the conclusion (i.e., (B)) from the original literature
stands. It is insufficient to observe that a reliably produced F is sometimes better than an
unreliably produced but intrinsically similar F. Zagzebski and others will agree but deny
that the explanation proceeds via the bare fact of reliable production. That was the point of
the coffee analogy. The analogy forces us to ask what else could make the difference, since
reliable ancestry as such seems insufficient.
This isn’t to deny that reliable processes have great epistemic value. The problem has
always concerned their products. As Ward Jones put it:
When we ask about the value of knowledge over mere true belief, we are asking not about
belief-forming methods but about their products. We have clear reason to care about reliable
methods of belief-formation, and the reliabilist is right to emphasize them. But it is unclear, on
reliabilism, why we should divide the desired products of belief-formation, true beliefs, into
those which were brought about by reliable methods and those that were not. The epistemic
instrumentalist gives us no way of evaluatively dividing true beliefs into those which have been
brought about by justifying methods versus those which have not ( Jones 1997, p. 425).11
This challenge remains a serious one.
9Cf. Goldman and Olsson (2009) and Goldman (2012).
10See Zagzebski (1996, pp. 165–194).
11Interestingly, Jones traces the swamping problem to truth-instrumentalism and notes that it is a problem for
internalists as well as reliabilists. But he didn’t consider how one might reject instrumentalism while preserving
Veritism, or emphasize other forms of value derivation. Zagzebski similarly emphasizes the generality of the
problem and traces it (in effect) to truth-instrumentalism, but again doesn’t think Veritism can be preserved
(Zagzebski 2003, p.16); indeed, she opposes Veritism there and monism generally in Zagzebski (2004). Zagzebski
and Jones deserve credit for their early appreciation of the problem’s generality. But they didn’t observe the core
axiological point that one can remain monistic on fundamental value if one is pluralist about value derivation.
It is surprising, since Zagzebski acknowledges that given that ‘if something is valuable it is also valuable to
appreciate or love it, then love of true belief has value because true belief has value’ (Zagzebski 2003, p.18).
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2.2 The Deeper Problem
The swamping problem runs deeper, as others have recognized.12 It is easy to see that the
problem is not just a problem about knowledge or just a problem for reliabilists.
To see the first point, note that reliabilists identify a belief’s being justified with its being
produced by a reliable type of belief-forming process. Assume they are right for the sake of
argument. We can use the same coffee analogy to argue that justification cannot as such add
epistemic value to true belief. That is bad: justification as such does add epistemic value to
true belief! This is not a restatement of the problem about knowledge: due to the Gettier
problem, no reliabilist will equate knowledge with justified true belief.
There is an even more general structure that makes the problem not just of limited in-
terest to reliabilists. On any view on which
being justified : true belief :: being produced by a good coffeemaker : good coffee
there is a worry that justification cannot as such add epistemic value to true belief. So, there
is a worry for any view on which the epistemic value of justified belief consists in its being
the mere product of some type of source that is only instrumentally good relative to true
belief. Reliabilists are hardly the only epistemologists who accept this assumption.
These observations lead to a general argument against Instrumentalist Veritism.13 In-
strumentalist Veritism entails that:
(I) Items other than true belief are epistemically good iff they (i) tend to produce true
(and not false) beliefs or (ii) are products of a source with property (i).
And the following is a natural generalization of the points about the coffeemaker case:
(II: Swamping Premise) If X has its source in something that is only instrumentally good
relative to property F and X already exemplifies F, the mere fact that X has that source
cannot as such make X better.
But according to Instrumentalist Veritism, justifying sources only have instrumental epis-
temic value relative to true belief. So (I) and (II) will entail:
(Bad) A true belief’s being justified cannot as such make it epistemically better.
Some would take this to undermine Veritism.14 But this is only because they assume Instru-
mentalism. Veritists can reject Instrumentalism and view the generalized swamping problem
as an argument against it. To support this tactic, I will show that the Swamping Premise does
not extend to other species of derivative value. This will show that the problem is a local one
for Instrumentalists. To drive the point home, I will show that there are similar problems
for all modest alternatives to Veritism that cling to Instrumentalism.
2.3 Why Other Forms of Derivative Value Help
Let us first understand why rejecting Instrumentalism can help Veritists. Doing so can help
them, I suggest, because other forms of derivative value are not subject to swamping by the
values on which they are parasitic. To see this, consider:
12Cf. Pritchard (2010, 2011).
13As Duncan Pritchard (2010, 2011) in effect observed.
14Cf. Pritchard (2011).
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(Stronger Swamping Premise) For no type of derivative value and no sense of ‘has its
source in’ is it true that:
if X has its source in something that only has derivative value relative to property F
but X already has F, X’s having that source as such makes X better.
This is false. Suppose Alice performs an act of beneficence because she values beneficence,
while Beatrice performs the same kind of action as a PR stunt. Plausibly, Alice’s action is
better than Beatrice’s because it manifests (and in this sense has its source in) real concern
for beneficence. Yet just as appreciating beauty is good because beauty is good, so valuing
beneficence is good because beneficence is good.
Here an act derives value by manifesting something only derivatively good relative to
another property that the act exemplifies. The source manifested is (1) Alice’s valuing of
beneficence, and the property exemplified is (2) beneficence. Yet it is plausible that the sheer
fact that Alice’s act has its source in (1) makes that act worthier per se. In a picture:
act
manifests has property of
valuing of
beneficence beneficence
whose value is parasitic (Hurka-wise) on
derives some value from
This would be impossible if the Stronger Swamping Premise were true. So it is false.
If the foregoing points are right, Veritism generates no problem: only its conjunction
with Instrumentalism does. If Veritists adopt a different model of value derivation, they can
avoid swamping just as it was avoided in the case of Alice’s beneficent action.
On the view I develop in §3, rational belief and knowledge gain epistemic worth by man-
ifesting different ways of valuing accuracy in thought. On this view, the case of knowing
parallels the case of Alice’s beneficent action. Knowledge requires a belief whose accuracy
manifests a disposition to hold beliefs only if there is sufficient objective and subjective evi-
dence that they are true. This disposition just is a way to value accuracy in thought. Ways
of valuing accuracy are epistemically good because accuracy is epistemically good. But this
‘because’ is not (purely) instrumental. Paralleling Alice’s case:
belief
manifests has property of
way of valuing ac-
curacy in thought
accuracy
whose value is parasitic (Hurka-wise) on
derives some value from
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I will explain the ways of valuing accuracy in thought in §3. The tactic is what matters now.
Veritists can claim that true beliefs can gain epistemic worth by manifesting ways of valuing
accuracy, just as beneficent actions can gain moral worth by manifesting an agent’s valuing
of beneficence. Both cases undermine the Stronger Swamping Premise.
So Veritists can avoid the swamping problem if they appeal to forms of derivative value
beyond the instrumental. But they must avoid the problem in this way. For the restricted
Swamping Premise is true. Instrumentalist Veritism is false.
2.4 A General Problem for Instrumentalists
We can strengthen this advice by seeing that if Instrumentalism were true, other economical
epistemic axiologies would face relatives of the swamping problem.
Observe that there is another side to Zagzebski’s analogy. We do not only think that
being produced by a reliable coffeemaker per se cannot improve good cups of coffee. We
also think that such ancestry cannot improve bad cups of coffee. If you drink vile coffee
and cringe, it is not comforting to be told: ‘Hey, at least it was produced by a reliable cof-
feemaker.’ These facts support a more striking sibling of the restricted Swamping Premise:
(Dud Principle) If X was produced by a source that is only good because it produces good
Fs, that fact as such can’t make X better if X is otherwise a bad F.
Carter and Jarvis (2012) took this to undermine the intuitions behind the swamping prob-
lem. For they thought that the Dud Principle would imply, crazily, that “non-factive epis-
temic properties—most saliently justification—are never epistemically valuable” (Carter and
Jarvis 2012, p.690). But this is too fast: that conclusion follows only if we grant Instru-
mentalism. Like the original Swamping Premise, the Dud Principle concerns mere product
value. The crazy conclusion would not follow from the Dud Principle if non-factive epis-
temic properties had a different kind of derivative epistemic value. Only if the Dud Principle
extends to other kinds of derivative value is Carter and Jarvis’s conclusion fair.
But the Dud Principle does not generalize, for the same reasons why the Swamping
Premise did not generalize. Consider someone trying to perform a beneficent act as a man-
ifestation of her valuing of beneficence, failing only due to bad luck. Her efforts remain
better than the failed efforts of someone merely looking for a PR boost.
What the Dud Principle really suggests is that Instrumentalism is an incomplete model
of derivative epistemic value. After all, it is not as if Carter and Jarvis can convince us that
vile coffee is better if it comes from an otherwise reliable coffee machine. Like the original
Swamping Premise, the Dud Principle captures a fact about mere products of instrumentally
good sources. But it is then easy to see that any modest axiology that embraces Instrumen-
talism will face a relative of the swamping problem.
Suppose knowledge is one’s fundamental epistemic good. Given Instrumentalism, how
can one explain the epistemic value of justified beliefs? One must claim that such beliefs
are good by being products of knowledge-conducive processes. But the Dud Principle then
makes it mysterious why justified false beliefs are epistemically good. From an Instrumen-
talist point of view, they are duds just like bad cups from otherwise reliable coffeemakers.
Expanding the stock of fundamental epistemic values doesn’t really help. Even if one
adds rational belief, justified belief, knowledge, understanding, and true belief to the list,
there remain epistemic values that (a) no one can reasonably take to be fundamental, but (b)
admit of no Instrumentalist explanation. Consider the epistemic value of trying one’s best to
form beliefs accurately. This is a paradigmatically derivative value: trying to do something
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good is admirable because it is intentionally directed at something good. But if we accept
Instrumentalism, it is hard to explain why it is derivatively epistemically good. Merely
trying to form one’s beliefs accurately is not reliably instrumental to accuracy, knowledge,
justification, etc. Yet there remains something admirable in one’s best efforts.
Any modest epistemic axiology that endorses Instrumentalism will face a relative of the
swamping problem. Some paradigmatically derivative epistemic values admit of no general
Instrumentalist explanation. So, everyone, not just Veritists, should reject Instrumentalism.
3 Non-Instrumentalist Veritism
Of course, work remains for Veritists. They must provide a more specific view that takes
advantage of our observations about forms of value derivation beyond the instrumental, and
explain how this view can capture central intuitions about epistemic value.
My view will secure these desiderata. After noting that there are more ways to value
something than by promoting it, I will suggest that central epistemic values can be viewed as
manifesting different ways of valuing accuracy, and as deriving accuracy-oriented epistemic
value thanks to the Extended Hurka Principle.
3.1 Other Ways of Valuing in General
Let’s start with a more general fact. It is a truism that values are items that it is proper to
value. Given the truism, one should ask for any fundamental value V in any domain:
Which ways of valuing V are the proper ways in the domain?
Instrumentalists might accept a narrow answer:
(The Teleological Answer) For any fundamental value V, the only basically proper way
to value V is to instrumentally promote V.15
But the Teleological Answer is implausible. There are many ways to value: dedication, loy-
alty, respect, veneration, love, support, and the many other items on Nozick’s list. This
answer regards only one as basically fitting to fundamental value. This is hardly a default
view. For some values, promotion is not the basically proper response. If friendship were
fundamentally ‘to be promoted’, we could properly spend less time caring about the friends
we have and more time amassing friends or causing others to have more friends. But we
can properly value friendship without taking ourselves to have reasons to produce more in-
stances of friendship.16 Fans of the Teleological Answer could multiply fundamental values
in reply, and claim that loyalty, commitment, respect, dedication, etc., are all fundamental
values. But this pluralism is implausible. Besides violating canons of parsimony, it fails to
explain asymmetries. Dedication to one’s friends matters because friendship matters.
These points highlight an insight needed for a version of Veritism that rejects Instrumen-
talism. The Veritist should capitalize on this insight and suggest that there are more ways
to value accuracy in thought than by producing a high ratio of true to false beliefs by any
means, including means that disrespect accuracy.
15I say ‘basically proper’ because the instrumentalist can obviously allow that other ways of valuing V are
non-basically proper in virtue of helping to instrumentally promote V.
16Cf. Scanlon (1998: 89).
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3.2 Ways to Place Value on Accuracy in Thought
How can we implement the insight? What are the ways to value accuracy in thought? I
understand the ways that are suited to play a role in traditional epistemological projects as
different positive relations to the following norm of accuracy:17
(AN) It is correct to believe P iff P is true.
AN is not a directly belief-guiding norm. But this norm can guide us indirectly.18 In being
so guided, we value accuracy in our thinking. Coherent beliefs, rational beliefs, justified
beliefs, and knowledge can be viewed as epistemically good from a truth-oriented point of
view by manifesting different ways to value accuracy in thought.
I will identify four positive relations to the norm of accuracy we can use to explain the
epistemic value of coherent, rational, justified, and knowledgeable belief from an accuracy-
oriented perspective. Before doing so, I will draw attention to a larger spectrum of ways
of being properly oriented toward values within which these fall. Since our ordinary talk
about ways of valuing is rather fuzzy, I will have to regiment the language a bit and stipulate
narrower, technical uses for some ordinary terms. But it will be clear, I hope, that there are
real joints on a pre-theoretically recognizable spectrum that these uses carve out. To further
forestall the worry that the discussion is merely stipulative, I will stress the connections that
my notions bear to ordinary evaluations of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness.
3.2.1 Proper Valuing in Disposition and Action: A Spectrum
I begin with the obvious: our dispositions and acts can manifest a more or less proper valuing
of some value or norm, and they will be correspondingly more or less admirable. Taking
the value of equality as an example, let’s start at the low end of the spectrum.
Consider Alice, who is disposed to treat people in the ways that she believes are equal.
There is something pro tanto admirable about Alice’s disposition. Its pro tanto admirableness
plausibly owes to the fact that it constitutes a minimal way of valuing equality. Consistently
with this fact, Alice might fail to value equality in a fully proper way, and fail to be fully
admirable. Suppose her beliefs about what would constitute equal treatment are ones that
she would see to be mistaken—and would modify and heed—if she reflected longer on facts
she is in a position to know. Her valuing seems less than fully proper. Nevertheless, provided
that her ignorance is not deliberate, she manifests some consideration for equality, and there
is some good in this consideration.19 While it would be better if she took more care to fit
her beliefs about equality to her evidence, it would also be worse in one way if she didn’t
manifested no consideration for equality at all. She is at least well-intentioned, and while
this might not count for much, it is pro tanto better to be well-intentioned than not to be.
17I make no claims about ways of valuing accuracy that are not suited to play a role in these projects. Here I
distance myself from responsibilists less conservative than Zagzebski. I also distance myself from any standard
kind of responsibilism, since responsibilists typically stress intellectual character traits. My ways of valuing are
not character traits. Here again I follow Hurka, who divorces virtue from character in his (2006).
18Cf. Wedgwood (2002, 2013).
19I wouldn’t make claims of the same strength as the one that follows about cases of motivated ignorance,
such as the cases Moody-Adams (1994) discusses. These cases involve people who manifest more disregard for
value than regard for value. Exactly how spinoffs of Alice’s case involving motivated ignorance bear on Hurka’s
Principle is a delicate question. Consistently with Hurka’s Principle, we could say that these spinoffs would
involve merely a low level of pro tanto intrinsic value that is outweighed by a greater level of pro tanto intrinsic
disvalue generated by the disregard manifested.
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Now compare another agent, Beatrice, who has a disposition not merely to treat people
in the ways that she believes are equal, but also to treat people in the ways her evidence sug-
gests comply with the reasons of equality. Beatrice’s valuing of equality is more admirable
than Alice’s. Yet even her disposition may fall short of fully proper valuing. The point is
familiar from recent literature on moral worth.20 Beatrice’s evidence might be problemat-
ically limited, and not necessarily in a way that reflects a procedural mistake in evidence
gathering. Suppose, for example, she lives in a benighted age and community in which it
is widely believed, often claimed by her epistemic superiors, and supposedly substantiated
by scientific evidence that human beings in a certain group lack some essential feature of
personhood. No matter how hard Beatrice reflects on the information available to her, she
will come to believe these individuals are not persons. As a result, Beatrice is not disposed to
treat members in this group with the same level of consideration that she treats other human
beings, though she is disposed to treat all individuals that her evidence suggests are persons
equally. While Beatrice is perhaps less flawed than Alice, she is hardly flawless. While she is
more than merely well-meaning, she still does not value equality in a fully proper way.
Now consider a third agent, Candace, who has a yet stronger disposition. Candace is
disposed to treat individuals in the ways that are actually supported by reasons of equality,
and for these reasons. She is sensitive not merely to apparent reasons of equality, but to
the objective reasons that underwrite the value of equality.21 Candace manifests excellence
in being for the value of equality, as Adams (2006) would say. Admittedly, her disposition
could be more or less steadfast. Even if she is largely sensitive to objective reasons of equality,
Candace might sometimes fail to conform to them. Indeed, dispositions are relative, as Sosa
(2015) says, to suitable situations and shape, and even in appropriate conditions a subject
might exhibit more or less excellence in responding to the equality-relevant reasons. So
Candace might fail to do what these reasons support in a particular case. In this respect we
might contrast Candace with Doris, who infallibly conforms to these reasons.
In fact, even if a person manifests her sensitivity to a value and successfully does what
that value favors doing, her action might still fall short as a manifestation of her valuing
because its success is not explained by her sensitivity. To take a different kind of example,
suppose the reasons of friendship favor Doris’s getting her friend Jim a gift that he will enjoy
on his birthday. And suppose Doris learns from a reliable source that Jim likes the films of
Nicholas Roeg, and so gets him a copy of The Man Who Fell to Earth. As it turns out, the
reliable source is wrong: her friend has only seen one Roeg film and didn’t particularly like it.
But in the last couple of months while Doris was travelling and out of contact with Jim, he
has become obsessed with the mid-1970s David Bowie. Accordingly, there is a good reason
to get John this gift. Here Doris manifests her general sensitivity to reasons of friendship,
and does what is favored by these reasons, but her success in doing so is nonetheless lucky.
Obviously, Doris is not blameworthy here. Nonetheless, her act could have been better
oriented in one way: its success in conforming to the reasons of friendship could have been a
manifestation of her sensitivity to reasons of friendship. While there may be nothing wrong
with Doris’s orientation to value, we can call her act less than fully proper in its orientation
to the reasons of friendship. Compared with the act of Elise—who gets Jim the film because
it features Bowie, whom she knows he loves—it is in one way less than ideal. This is not
to say that the action is open to strong criticism. But it is increasingly recognized in the
20See especially Harman (2011).
21See Parfit (2011), Schroeder (2007, 2008, 2009), Lord (2010), Vogelstein (2012), and Whiting (2014) for
discussion of the distinction between apparent and objective normative reasons. Note also that I am using
‘sensitive’ in its ordinary, dispositional sense, not in Nozick’s counterfactual sense.
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literature on moral worth that if an agent successfully does what the reasons in fact support
accidentally, then even if the agent manifests sensitivity to reasons, there is a respect in which
her act could be worthier: its success could manifest this sensitivity.22
These examples illustrate a spectrum of propriety in orientations to value:
← less
Alice Beatrice Candace Doris Elise
more→
Propriety of Person’s Orientation
Propriety of Act’s Orientation
It is, I grant, more natural to reserve the expression ‘way of valuing’ for a person’s orientation
to value. Nonetheless, I think it is important to recognize the rightmost two points on the
spectrum, given that the Extended Hurka Principle applies not only to ways of valuing but
also to their manifestations. It is plausible that an act that manifests a proper way of valuing
is in that respect non-instrumentally good. It is also plausible that an act that manifests a
way of proper valuing and succeeds in doing what the value requires is non-instrumentally
better, and better still if its very success manifests that way of valuing. Moreover, while the
distinction is admittedly fine, it does seem right to distinguish between how well a person is
oriented toward a value when she acts, and how well her acts are oriented toward value.
So far I’ve been loose in the language I’ve used for the different points on this spectrum.
This looseness is unsurprising: ordinary language does not contain terms that exactly cir-
cumscribe the boundaries. Nonetheless, for the sake of stating a more precise view, it would
be useful to have some terms for the different points on this spectrum. Accordingly, I’m
going to regiment the language a little. I’ll call the way of valuing that Alice manifests com-
mitment, the way of valuing that Beatrice manifests weak respect, and the way of valuing that
Candace manifests strong respect. I’ll also say that an act which is in conformity with what a
value recommends complies with value when its conformity manifests strong respect.
The rationale for ‘commitment’ is clear enough: because Alice is following her con-
science and trying to conform to the reasons of equality, she shows some commitment to
equality. Mere commitment falls far short of what values demand, as we’ve seen. One can be
committed to a value while being mistaken, and indeed irrationally so, about what that value
requires. The rationale for ‘respect’ is less obvious, because talk of respect can be used to
pick out many different things. As Darwall (1977) pointed out, it is important to distinguish
between respect as esteem and respect as heedfulness (which he calls ‘recognition respect’). It is
the latter sort of respect I have in mind. Darwall originally glossed this kind of respect as fol-
lows: ‘There is a kind of respect which can have any of a number of different sorts of things
as its object and which consists, most generally, in a disposition to weigh appropriately in
one’s deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly’ (Darwall
1977, p. 38).23
Darwall’s gloss on recognition respect is not entirely helpful: what is it to weigh the
22See, e.g., Arpaly and Schroeder (2014), Mantel (2013) and Lord (2015).
23In more recent work, Darwall uses ‘recognition respect’ in a narrower, second-personal sense; see esp. Dar-
wall (2006). But the original sense was broader.
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feature appropriately? Here I think we can distinguish a more subjective notion of appropri-
ateness from a more objective notion, and hence distinguish between weak and strong respect,
as I’ve suggested. An act manifests weak respect for a value when it manifests a disposition
to do what seems likely, relative to the appearances, to correctly respond to that value. It
manifests strong respect for a value when it manifests a disposition to what is objectively
likely, relative to the evidence, to correctly respond to that value.24
Since I will be defining proper valuing of accuracy in terms of certain positive relations
to the norm of accuracy, it must be recognized that the three relations of commitment, weak
respect, and strong respect can also hold between a person and a norm. Viewed in this way,
they have the following common core: all three ways of properly orienting oneself toward a
norm are dispositions to do what the epistemic reasons suggest is likely to be in conformity
with the norm. The differences simply turn on how ‘epistemic reasons’ and ‘likely’ are
understood in this core formula.
To see what I have in mind, consider the familiar distinction between objective and
apparent reasons. Objective reasons are facts that count in favor of acts and attitudes by
bearing on their correctness. These facts are not all ones to which we have privileged access.
Examples in epistemology include the kind of evidence to which we refer when we say things
like: ‘There was evidence all along that Jones did it. We just discovered it.’ Objective reasons
are by themselves rarely relevant to justification and rationality. Only apparent reasons and
objective reasons that are apparent matter for rationality and justification.
While there is considerable disagreement about the nature of apparent reasons, it is clear
that there are such things. Indeed, there are several such things, since appearance talk can be
used in several ways. Some appearances are belief-relative, others are not. The appearance at
issue in the Müller-Lyer illusion is not essentially belief-relative. Call this kind of appearance
seemings-relative. These appearances are non-factive, but there are also factive appearances,
exemplified by seeing that P, remembering that P, intuiting that P, etc. Reasons that are appar-
ent in this sense are objective reasons. Call them factively apparent reasons. They can include
introspective appearances, like the appearance associated with being aware of some experi-
ence. So, even in cases of illusion in otherwise dependable worlds, one has some factively
apparent reasons to believe worldly propositions. Facts about one’s experiences are generally
reliable indicators of external reality in those happy worlds.
With these distinctions in mind, I suggest that for any norm N,
commitment to N in φ-ing is grounded in a disposition to φ only if, conditional on the
belief-relative (de dicto) apparent reasons, φ-ing is subjectively likely to conform to N;
weak respect for N in φ-ing is grounded in a disposition to φ only if, conditional on
the seemings-relative apparent reasons, φ-ing is epistemically likely to conform to N;
strong respect for N in φ-ing is grounded in a disposition to φ only if, conditional on
the factively apparent reasons, φ-ing is objectively likely to conform to N;
compliancewith N in φ-ing is partly grounded in a disposition to φ only if, conditional
on the all objective epistemic reasons, φ-ing objectively likely to conform to N
and fully grounded in conforming to N by manifesting that disposition
24The appeal to objective likelihood of compliance doesn’t suggest that we are giving an Instrumentalist
account of respect. To agree that X-conducivity is necessary for some valuable property is not to hold that this
property’s value is wholly or even partly explained by X-conducivity. Indeed, one could reverse the order of
explanation: X-conducivity matters because it is constitutive of some more fundamental value (e.g., respect).
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To put all of this in another diagram:
← less proper
Commitment Weak Respect Strong Respect Compliance
more proper→
These things can come apart in more than just the obvious ways. Consider Huck Finn. He
believes he is acting wrongly in helping Jim. But his act is praiseworthy all-things-considered.
This is because while it fails to manifest commitment to moral norms, it in fact manifests
strong respect, and indeed compliance, with these norms. Similar phenomena appear in the
epistemic case. Imagine Buck, who has been presented with numerous skeptical arguments
that he takes to be decisive, but whose first-order beliefs are unaffected and continue to be
responsive to the first-order evidence. Buck is intuitively just as praiseworthy in continuing
to hold his first-order beliefs as Huck is in continuing to help Jim. Of course, this is not
to say that manifesting a commitment to a norm has no value. As Arpaly (2003) agreed,
Huck’s acts would be in one respect admirable if they manifested commitment. All these
cases show is that respect is more proper and also more valuable than commitment, not that
commitment is not proper or pro tanto valuable at all.
3.2.2 Epistemically Proper Valuing in Disposition and Belief: A Special Case
I am now in a position to explain more precisely how I think the Veritist is in a position to
make use of the Extended Hurka Principle to explain the value of coherent belief, rational
belief, justified belief, and knowledge. Notice first that if we replace ‘N’ with the accuracy
norm AN in the earlier general accounts of commitment, respect, and compliance, we get
the following characterizations of some ways of valuing accuracy in thought. One manifests:
commitment to AN in believing P iff one manifests a disposition to believe P only if,
conditional on the belief-relative (de dicto) apparent reasons, P is subjectively likely;
weak respect in believing P iff one manifests a disposition to believe P only if, condi-
tional on the seemings-relative apparent reasons, P is epistemically likely;
strong respect in believing P iff one manifests a disposition to believe P only if, condi-
tional on the factively apparent reasons, P is objectively likely;
compliance with AN in believing P only if (i) one strongly respects AN in believing P,
and (ii) the accuracy of one’s belief that P manifests this respect.
These characterizations align with independently attractive views about rationality, justifi-
cation, and knowledge.25 It is plausible that rational belief is belief in accordance with the
apparent epistemic reasons, that justified belief is belief in accordance with objective reasons
to which one has access, and that knowledge is accurate belief whose accuracy manifests a dis-
position to heed objectively good epistemic reasons. Phenomenal conservatives have offered
such an account of rational belief.26 Disjunctivists and others have offered such an account
of justified belief.27 While there isn’t an existing account of knowledge that aligns perfectly
25I assume that rationality and justification are distinct properties, as Littlejohn (2012) argues. This assump-
tion is not essential for the success of my project, however. I’m just showing that if the two are distinct, we can
explain the difference in epistemic value between the two.
26See Huemer (2007).
27See Pritchard (2012) and Littlejohn (2012).
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with the view just mentioned, it is attractive in merging themes from virtue epistemology
and reasons-first epistemology. Schroeder (2015) argues that knowledge consists in belief for
sufficient objective and subjective reasons. If one holds that proper basing on objective rea-
sons simply consists in aptly manifesting a disposition to heed objective reasons, it is natural
to see the aforementioned characterization of knowledge as a spinoff of Schroeder’s view.
Accordingly, it is plausible, I think, to uphold the following connections:
one’s belief that P is structurally rational iff it manifests commitment to AN;
one’s belief that P is substantively rational iff it manifests weak respect for AN;28
one’s belief that P is justified iff it manifests strong respect for AN;
one’s belief that P is knowledge iff one complies with AN in believing that P.
There is truth-oriented unity here: coherent, rational, justified, and knowledgeable belief all
manifest different positive relations to the norm of accuracy.
Before deriving the epistemic value of these properties using the Extended Hurka Prin-
ciple, it is worth briefly addressing a concern that I will take up again in §4.2. One might
worry that the explanation I’m seeking confronts a dilemma. In particular, one might worry
that either the connections I’ve proposed between the central epistemic properties and the
ways of valuing accuracy are implausibly strong, or the way I’m understanding ways of
valuing accuracy are implausibly weak. Fortunately, I believe there is a simple response.
In reply to the first horn, I would remind the reader that when the ways of valuing ac-
curacy are understood as I’ve understood them, these connections are no less plausible than
some familiar accounts of rationality, justification, and knowledge. Of course, it is beyond
the scope of this paper to defend these analyses of rationality, justification and knowledge.
What matters is that even if these analyses are not uncontroversial, it is plausible that there
are important epistemic desiderata carved out by the analysantia. There may be other plau-
sible ways of thinking about, for example, knowledge. Indeed, I think there is a kind of
knowledge had by animals that doesn’t require reasons. But I think it is much less obvious
that this kind of knowledge is necessarily better than true belief. Moreover, the more de-
manding kind of knowledge is not so demanding as to be rare: unsophisticated knowers,
including children, often believe things for good epistemic reasons.
So much for the first horn of the dilemma. And I’ve already in effect answered the second
horn. As I pointed out earlier, the core intuition behind Hurka’s Principle extends far and
covers valuing in a broad, psychologically undemanding sense. One needn’t understand
valuing in the thick sense at issue in, say, Watson (1975) for it to be plausible that valuing
the good is good. Indeed, one needn’t understand valuing as something occurrent, explicitly
voiced, emotional, or the like, for it to be plausible that valuing the good is good. Think
again of Huck Finn. It is plausible that in acting as he did, Huck manifested proper valuing
of Jim’s humanity, and that his act was in this respect highly non-instrumentally admirable.
This is in spite of the fact that Huck was not only unaware that he was correctly responding
to the real reasons, but explicitly looked unfavorably upon what he was doing.
3.3 Deriving Epistemic Value via the Extended Hurka Principle
Once we see that these central epistemic values reflect different ways of valuing accuracy in
thought, we can use the Extended Hurka Principle to explain their epistemic value from an
28Ethicists distinguish structural and substantive rationality; cf. Broome (1999) and Kolodny (2005). Struc-
tural rationality consists in coherence. Substantive rationality requires heeding good reasons.
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accuracy-oriented point of view. Consider rationality. It requires sensitivity (in a disposi-
tional sense) to the apparent evidence bearing on the truth of one’s belief. That is a way to
value accuracy in thought. If so, we can use the Extended Hurka Principle to explain the
epistemic value of rational belief in accuracy-oriented terms. A similar story would explain













manifests a way of
whose value is parasitic on
A similar story explains why coherence and knowledge have derivative epistemic value. In
complying with coherence norms, one manifests commitment to AN.29 In knowing, one
complies with AN. These are epistemically proper ways to value accuracy in thought. So we
can explain the epistemic value of coherence and knowledge from the perspective of accuracy
just like we explained the epistemic value of substantive rationality and justification.
There are epistemic values other than coherence, rationality, justification, and knowl-
edge. But I hypothesize that in a familiar sense of ‘properly epistemic’, every properly
epistemic value that is not just instrumentally valuable relative to the others that I discussed
will be explicable in something like this framework. In §4, I will address objections to this
hypothesis. For now, I am happy to have derived the epistemic value of four central items.
3.4 Comparative Propriety and Rankings of Value
Commitment, weak and strong respect, and compliance are all proper positive relations to
AN. If so, coherent belief, rational belief, justified belief, and knowledge are all derivatively
good from the perspective of accuracy. Yet one would like to rank these epistemic values.
Coherent belief, rational belief, justified belief, and knowledge are not equally epistemically
29One can be accidentally coherent, and so coherent agents can fail to manifest commitment to AN. The
claim here is only that compliance with requirements of epistemic coherence manifests commitment to AN.
Some might doubt the claims about coherence on the grounds that being incoherent can be a way of valuing
accuracy: perhaps, for example, one believes claims that one knows cannot all be true, since it is the best one can
do by AN’s lights. But first of all, the best examples of what the objector has in mind are the kinds of cases that
generate the preface paradox, and in the literature on coherence, it is not uncontroversial that these examples
actually involve violations of coherence requirements. Easwaran and Fitelson (2015), for example, argue that
deductive consistency is not a requirement of coherence, partly on the basis of considerations about the preface
paradox.
A second point is that even if preface cases are understood as the objector suggests, they aren’t counterexamples
to the claim on offer. The claim is that in being (non-accidentally) coherent, one manifests proper valuing of
accuracy, and that coherence is pro tanto derivatively epistemically good for this reason. This claim doesn’t not
imply that being incoherent is inconsistent with valuing accuracy. All that follows is that for any agent, if that
agent is (non-accidentally) coherent, she manifests one way of valuing accuracy. This second claim doesn’t imply
that for any agent, if that agent is incoherent, she does not properly value accuracy in any way.
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good. One wants to say that knowledge is better than justified belief, justified belief is better
than substantively rational belief (if one draws this distinction), and substantively rational
belief is better than structurally rational belief. How should we explain these comparisons?
Although commitment, weak respect, strong respect, and compliance are all proper pos-
itive relations to norms, they are not equally proper. For any norm in any domain, it is most
proper to comply with the norm. If one must fail to comply, it is more proper to do so with
strong respect than without. If one must fail to strongly respect a norm, it is more proper
to do so with weak respect than without. If one must fail to weakly respect the norm, it is
more proper to do so while at least continuing to manifest commitment to the norm. These
general differences explain why
knowledge > justification > substantive rationality > structural rationality
After all, for any norm N, compliance is a more proper relation to N than respect of either
kind, and respect of either kind is a more proper relation to N than mere commitment.
Since what is best from the perspective of N co-travels with what is most proper to N, we
can say that knowledge is best from the perspective of AN. So, compatibly with accuracy’s
being the fundamental epistemic value, we can agree that knowledge is epistemically best.
This is not paradoxical. Compliance is the most proper response for any system of
norms. This does not mean that there is a further norm of compliance. In addition to
a given norm X, one does not need another norm that says, ‘Comply with X!’ There are
just norms, and it is a conceptual truth about norms that compliance is more proper than
either kind of respect and either kind of respect is more proper than mere commitment.
In the epistemic domain, the fundamental thing is AN. Just as compliance is not a further
fundamental norm, knowledge is not a further fundamental value.
Is this illuminating? Yes. We can see the ranking of epistemic value as a special case
of a general propriety ordering for positive relations to norms. So, the account is far more
illuminating than some view on which it is a bedrock truth that knowledge is better than
substantive rationality and substantive rationality is better than coherence.
Have I presupposed what I was trying to explain? No. I appealed to general truths about
the comparative propriety of certain positive relations to norms, not particular truths about
the comparative goodness of the states that manifest these positive relations to the norm of
accuracy. And the appeal to truths about comparative propriety wasn’t circular: propriety
is a deontic concept, not an evaluative one, and it is non-trivial to draw conclusions about
comparative goodness from comparative propriety judgments.
3.5 Advantages
The version of Veritism I’ve sketched has many attractions. Let’s consider them.
My Veritism is the first to honor the fact that value derivation need not proceed via
instrumental relations. This yields advantages. The Swamping Premise does not generalize
to other forms of derivative value. Just as acts that manifest ethjcally proper ways of valuing
ethical values are ethically better, so doxastic attitudes that manifest epistemically proper
ways of valuing accuracy are epistemically better.
My view inherits the broader virtues of Veritism. Veritism is a simple axiology. Parsi-
mony is as much a virtue in axiology as it is elsewhere. Supplemented with more sophis-
ticated views about derivative value, Veritism also has great explanatory power. And its
explanatory power is intuitive. It is intuitive that we care about things like rationality and
justification because we care about accuracy.
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Since I deny that the ‘because’ must be understood instrumentally, I can vindicate this
intuitive claim more directly than Instrumentalists. Forming beliefs in a way that appears
likely to achieve accuracy does not entail reliable achievement of accuracy. Just consider
demon worlds, where our experiences are the same but the demon ensures that they radically
fail to match external reality. These worlds do suggest that some epistemic values cannot be
explained in terms of truth-conducivity. But this does not show that not all epistemic values
are truth-oriented. It just shows that truth orientation isn’t a merely instrumental matter.
Isn’t rationality a way of ‘subjectively promoting’ accuracy? Sure. But Instrumentalism
makes it unclear why this is more than apparently good. Apparent goodness may be linked
to obligation. But it is not a kind of goodness, just as apparent wealth is not a kind of wealth.
Yet rationality doesn’t just have apparent epistemic value. It has real epistemic value, even
in demon worlds. The only way to explain this short of an error theory is to see ‘subjective
promotion’ of accuracy as constituting something further: a way to value accuracy.
4 Six Objections Answered
A theory can have many virtues while facing conclusive objections. Having sketched my
theory and explained its virtues, I will now answer six major objections. Of course, I cannot
pretend to answer all possible objections to Veritism in this paper. My focus will be on
objections that bear on the success of my defense of Veritism against the swamping problem,
and of the particular Non-Instrumentalist version of Veritism I’ve sketched.
4.1 What about the Costs of Rejecting Instrumentalism?
One might agree that Instrumentalism has the costs I’ve suggested while worrying that re-
jecting it will be at least as costly. More specifically, one might think that Instrumentalism
does important work for the Veritist that cannot be done in its absence. The Instrumentalist
can, after all, tell a helpful story about why we properly care about justification, rationality,
and other central epistemic statuses: beliefs with these properties are more likely to be true,
and so they help in one’s pursuit of the fundamental epistemic goal. One might think that
is not, by contrast, clear that Non-Instrumentalist Veritists can tell a similarly helpful story
about why we should care about such statuses. Indeed, why think that caring about accuracy
gives one any reason to care about ‘valuing accuracy in thought’ independently of whether
doing so helps to enhance the accuracy of one’s doxastic inventory?30
Reply. To this objection I’ll offer three overlapping responses. Firstly, the objection over-
looks the fact that rejecting Instrumentalism is compatible with accepting all the derivative
value and all the axiological explanations that the Instrumentalist accepts. Instrumentalism’s
opponent simply insists that there ismore derivative value around—and more axiological ex-
planations to be given—than Instrumentalists suggest. So rejecting Instrumentalism needn’t
carry an explanatory cost. Secondly, in virtue of explaining the value of central epistemic
statuses like justification and rationality, my view does explain why it is proper to care about
them. Moreover, it doesn’t follow from my view—as the objection suggests—that one ought
to care about accuracy independently of caring about the promotion of accuracy, at least
not in any objectionable sense. Finally, Instrumentalism simply doesn’t give a satisfactory
answer to the question of why we properly care about all derivative epistemic statuses, if
30Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this objection.
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‘properly’ is understood epistemically.31
To elaborate on the first point, let’s consider what rejecting Instrumentalism involves.
Instrumentalism claims that all derivative epistemic value is instrumental. Its negation is
equivalent to the claim that some derivative epistemic value is not instrumental. This is not
the claim that no derivative epistemic value is instrumental. Instrumentalism’s opponents
can agree that everything Instrumentalists deem derivatively valuable is valuable in part for
instrumental reasons. They simply add either that some things are derivatively valuable for
multiple reasons (some non-instrumental) or that there are more derivatively epistemically
valuable things than Instrumentalists believe. I add both claims. Evidence-sensitive dispo-
sitions are epistemically good partly because they are dispositions to hit the mark of truth
in actuality, but also partly because they constitute respect for accuracy.32 There are also
epistemically good things that Instrumentalism doesn’t dub good. False beliefs that mani-
fest respect for accuracy are epistemically good, as are evidence-sensitive dispositions in the
demon world. Given the Dud Principle, Non-Instrumentalist Veritism doesn’t explain the
former claim. Since it seems analytic that something cannot have instrumental value in a
world w if it isn’t instrumental to value in w, it also doesn’t explain the latter claim.33
So as I understand it, Non-Instrumentalist Veritism has all the explanatory power of
Instrumentalist Veritism and more. Of course, explanatory power isn’t the sole theoretical
virtue. And although it is monistic about fundamental value, my view is pluralistic about
value derivation relations, and hence less simple than Instrumentalist Veritism. But this loss
in simplicity is justified on explanatory grounds: whereas the Instrumentalist Veritist must
invoke an error theory,34 the Non-Instrumentalist Veritist can take our intuitions about the
value of knowledge, justified belief, rational belief, etc., at face value. It is anyway not clear
that reasonable parsimony requires minimizing kinds of derivative value or value deriva-
tion. We already acknowledge all the ingredients necessary for constructing these things.
It is obvious that there are more relations to fundamental value than promotion (e.g., I
value persons, though not primarily by trying to create them), and also clear that there are
more axiologically relevant such relations. It is a further question whether there are sev-
eral fundamentally axiologically relevant relations. But I’ve already defended my answer to
that question. And again, many people outside epistemology already think there are several
types of derivative value. The proposal is simply to take advantage of tools already being
used outside epistemology, not to invent new ones.
To be sure, one might wonder whether we must bother with these tools, and whether
they really help to explain why we properly care about rationality, justification, and other
derivative epistemic values. But the answers to both questions are affirmative. I’ll articulate
these answers in turn, showing first why it is wrong to think that Instrumentalism explains
why we properly care about the various derivative epistemic values.
Instrumentalism doesn’t plausibly explain our intuitions about the epistemic value of
rationality. The inhabitant of the demon world is intuitively better off from an epistemic
31Perhaps the only thing of non-epistemic value about these statuses is that they are means to accurate belief.
But the focus here is on their epistemic value. There is a difference between being an epistemic item that is
valuable and being epistemically valuable. Theories of the two may drift far apart.
32Unless derivative value cannot be overdetermined, we are not barred from making this claim. And surely
such overdetermination is possible: the healthiness and pleasantness of some food might each ground sufficient
reasons for valuing it, and hence each provide sufficient explanations of why it is valuable (i.e., worth valuing).
33For a longer defense of this claim, see Sylvan (Ms).
34There are sophisticated error theories in the literature. For example, in addition to the type instrumentalist
story critiqued earlier, Goldman and Olson (2009) offer a ‘value autonomization’ explanation of why we treat
knowledge as more valuable than true belief (consistently with it not really being better). I don’t deny that this
error theory has some plausibility, but I prefer to avoid error theories when possible.
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point of view in that world in virtue of believing rationally. Instrumentalism hence doesn’t
explain—given that value coincides with that which it is fitting to value—why it is fitting
to care about rationality. Perhaps the Instrumentalist will simply deny that it is fitting to
value rational belief in the demon world. But this is a significant cost. By contrast, my view
offers a simple and appealing story: rationality is valuable even in the demon world because
it is constitutive of respect for accuracy, which is a fitting response to the value of accuracy,
and hence derivatively valuable via Hurka’s Principle. Since it is derivatively valuable, it is
fitting to value it. Perhaps the objector doesn’t see why we should think that respect is a
fitting response to the value of accuracy. But I’ve already given the argument for that claim:
the lesson of the swamping problem and of the demon world just is that there are more ways
to properly value accuracy than to produce it, and these include respect and commitment.
Now, the question ‘Why care about rational belief?’ could be heard in a more demanding
way, asking why we ought to care about rationality, not just why it is good and hence
fittingly valued. But I don’t find it obvious that we ought to care about rationality, just
that doing so is fitting. It is an empirical question whether caring about rationality will
itself enable one to respect the norm of accuracy. One might do better to just think hard
about interesting questions and respond to one’s evidence without intellectual navel-gazing.
This is consistent with my view, which only enjoins one to manifest respect for accuracy.
Thinking hard about questions and responding to one’s evidence can suffice for satisfying
that injunction, as I’ll stress again in addressing the next objection.
A final challenge still needs to be addressed. It is tempting to agree with the objector
that we shouldn’t care about accuracy independently of whether doing so helps to enhance
the accuracy of one’s doxastic inventory. But there are two claims that one could be making
here. One could saying that it is improper to care about accuracy without caring whether
one’s doxastic inventory is more rather than less accurate. That claim is true, but its truth
doesn’t support Instrumentalism. Such a combination of care and apathy is incoherent, and
the opponent of Instrumentalism has an explanation of the badness of this incoherence: one
cannot really respect accuracy while not trying to do what by one’s own lights would help
one to abide by the norm of accuracy.35
There is something else one could be saying in claiming that we shouldn’t care about ac-
curacy ‘independently’ of whether doing so helps to enhance the accuracy of one’s doxastic
corpus. One could be claiming that it is not fitting to have the preference that one manifest
respect for accuracy even when—unbeknownst to one—this respect makes no difference to
one’s accuracy. Given the link between fitting attitudes and value, this claim is equivalent
to the claim that it is not epistemically better for the demon-worlder to heed her subjective
evidence (which constitutes her manifesting respect for accuracy). Perhaps the Instrumen-
talist is happy to make this claim. I am not. There is a respect in which the demon-worlder
is better off in her own world in virtue of believing epistemically rationally, where ‘better
off’ means really better off, not just better off from her perspective. Instrumentalism suggests
otherwise, and this is a significant cost.
Let’s take stock. As we saw, rejecting Instrumentalism has no explanatory cost, and its
35Note that there is no extensional difference between what a (proposition-wise) subjective instrumentalist
enjoins us to do and what my view enjoins us to do in the demon world: manifesting respect for accuracy
is necessarily equivalent to doing what seems most likely to get one the correct answer to the question one
is asking. But the fact that the two coincide doesn’t suggest that the instrumentalist is right. The important
question is why it is genuinely a good thing, and not merely apparently a good thing, to do what is subjectively
right. It is easier to answer this question if one takes the value of respect for accuracy to be prior to the value
of doing what seems likely to abide by the norm of accuracy. There is nothing strange about taking one of two
necessarily equivalent properties to be more fundamental (axiologically or otherwise).
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loss in simplicity is justified on the basis of its gains in explanatory power. Instrumentalism
struggles to explain why we properly care about epistemic statuses that seem to matter, and
has no advantage vis-à-vis others. By contrast, my view does explain why we properly care
about the various epistemic statuses that seem to matter. It does so without claiming that we
ought to care about accuracy independently of whether doing enhances the accuracy of one’s
doxastic inventory, at least when this claim is understood objectionably.
4.2 Too Demanding?
I said coherence, rationality, justification, and knowledge are epistemically valuable in virtue
of manifesting ways of valuing accuracy in thought. But must we value accuracy in thought
to believe coherently, rationally, justifiedly, or knowingly? Isn’t this too demanding?
Reply. This objection is itself nourished by overly demanding assumptions. In particular, it
assumes that valuing accuracy in thought is more demanding than it is.
It is plausible that when we think carefully and heed the apparent evidence bearing on
the accuracy of our beliefs, we manifest some respect for accuracy in our thinking. This fits
under a more general pattern. When we reason carefully and heed the apparent evidence
bearing on whether we would conform to a norm N by φ-ing, it is plausible that our φ-ing
exhibits respect for N. Hence, respecting accuracy needn’t be psychologically demanding.
This idea is not strained. If Sal thinks carelessly and forms beliefs iff they are comforting,
it is natural to fault him for placing insufficient value on accuracy in his thinking. When we
do so, we are calling for something more modest than love or passion for accuracy. Love and
passion aren’t the only forms of valuing. They didn’t figure in my account. We needn’t view
respect, commitment or compliance as constituted by emotions or states with any fancy feel.
They are just ways to be attuned to factors that bear on the accuracy of one’s beliefs.
Indeed, ways of valuing accuracy could simply be grounded in competences to correctly
respond to reasons.36 This is true, at any rate, if competence is understood as epistemically
good because its exercises constitute ways to value accuracy. This is not to say that exercising
any kind of epistemic competence is sufficient for manifesting a fully proper valuing of
accuracy in thought. Norman the reliable clairvoyant perhaps manifests some epistemic
competence, but I wouldn’t want to say that he values accuracy in his thinking in a fully
proper way.37 The competences that constitute measurably proper ways of valuing accuracy
are competences to correctly respond to accuracy-relevant reasons, where the reasons are
either belief-relative, evidence-relative, or objective.
One might suspect the objection could be revived on the grounds that not all justified
beliefs or pieces of knowledge are based on reasons. But here it is worth noting that a belief
can manifest a reasons-sensitive competence without being based (at least not consciously)
on a reason. Sosa put it well:
[N]o human blessed with reason has merely animal knowledge of the sort attainable
by beasts. For even when perceptual belief derives as directly as it ever does from
sensory stimuli, it is still relevant that one has not perceived the signs of contrary tes-
timony. . . . [R]eason is always at least a silent partner on the watch for other relevant
36Cf. Greco (1999: 289).
37I am happy to grant that he may exhibit some positive relation to accuracy with some non-instrumental
epistemic value. I am perhaps committed to this claim in virtue of my broad use of ‘valuing’, but do not see this
as a problem. The intuition to honor here is comparative, and my view explains it.
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data, a silent partner whose very silence is a contributing cause of the belief outcome.
(Sosa 1991, p. 240)
What Sosa is noting is that human knowledge requires reasons-sensitive belief. Yet in believ-
ing in a reasons-sensitive way, it is plausible that a believer manifests some kind of respect for
accuracy. So even with respect to the beliefs that constitute non-inferential knowledge, we
can uphold the picture. While it is implausible to make this claim about animal knowledge,
it is not a datum that animal knowledge is better than mere true belief.
Of course, it is only in a broad sense of ‘valuing’ that a person who is sensitive to
accuracy-relevant reasons automatically counts as manifesting a valuing of accuracy. But
as I pointed out earlier, Hurka’s Principle applies no less plausibly to valuing in this psy-
chologically undemanding sense. If anything, it applies more plausibly to it. Recall Huck
Finn. In a thick sense of ‘valuing’, it may be false that Huck manifests a valuing of moral
reasons when he helps Jim and in doing so acts against what he takes the moral reasons to be.
Nonetheless, Huck is sensitive to the real moral reasons, and in manifesting this sensitivity,
he does recognitionally respect these reasons and his act is morally worthy for that reason.
Such cases suggest that one is more praiseworthy for manifesting this psychologically less
demanding kind of respect than one would be for manifesting the psychologically more de-
manding kind that implies conscious de dicto regard. That fact suggests in turn that this less
psychologically demanding kind of respect is more proper, and so non-instrumentally better.
It is worth stressing one final respect in which my view is less psychologically demanding
than it might seem. Notice that my view does not require that for a person to be rational in
believing P, this person must have a general disposition to respect the norm of accuracy for
any Q she considers and manifest this more general disposition in believing that P. While
the characterizations of commitment and respect I offered in §3.2.2 were dispositional, the
dispositions were local and proposition-relative. I said, for example, that one manifests
weak respect for AN in believing P iff one manifests a disposition to believe P only if,
conditional on the seemings-relative apparent reasons, P is epistemically likely.
One can manifest this local kind of respect for AN in believing P without manifesting any
more global respect for AN. While a person will be less admirable if her respect is merely
local, her belief need not be less admirable so long as it manifests local respect. The point is
familiar from some of Hurka’s other work.38 As Hurka notes, virtue evaluations of acts are
local and don’t require backing by global traits. If I help a person in need for that person’s
own sake, my act is virtuous even if it fails to manifest some more general habit.
Relatedly, it is irrelevant to the negative local evaluation of a person’s acts or attitudes
whether that person has some generally admirable disposition that prevents her from per-
forming similarly negatively evaluable acts on a regular basis. As Hurka also notes,39 even
if someone isn’t generally disposed to kick dogs for the heck of it—and indeed generally
cherishes dogs—we could still condemn that person for kicking one intentionally on a blue
moon. Similarly, even if a person cares greatly in general about forming beliefs only if they
are accurate, and is disposed in most cases to recognitionally respect the norm of accuracy
in belief, it remains possible for that person to fail to recognitionally respect it in some par-
ticular cases. In those cases, it is irrelevant to the evaluation of that particular belief that the
person in other cases is generally disposed to respect the norm of accuracy.
38See Hurka (2006).
39Hurka (2006, pp. 70-1).
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Indeed, my view goes farther, since it claims only that epistemically (im)proper ways of
valuing accuracy bear on the epistemic evaluation of beliefs. So even if a person sings high
praises of accuracy and desires to desire to have accurate beliefs, this fact is irrelevant from
an epistemic point of view if such praisings and desires cannot themselves be evaluated as
epistemically proper or improper. Yet there is a familiar sense of ‘epistemic evaluation’ hav-
ing to do with the constitutive standards for doxastic attitudes on which such things aren’t
genuine objects of epistemic evaluation. Of course, for Hurka’s Principle to be extended to
the epistemic domain, it is necessary that some things worth calling ‘valuings’ can be epis-
temically evaluated. But the line is not difficult to draw: the valuings that played a role in my
account were belief-forming dispositions, and such dispositions can be epistemically evaluated
in the narrower sense no less than beliefs.
4.3 Doesn’t the View Then Collapse into Familiar Views?
My reply dovetails with another objection. Doesn’t this reply show that my view collapses
into familiar views? Aren’t the properties that subvene my ways of valuing accuracy just
familiar ones from other theories of rationality and knowledge?
Reply. This objection misses the point of my view. I can agree that my ways of valuing
accuracy are grounded in familiar properties from other accounts of the nature of rationality
and knowledge. My view is not about the nature of rationality or knowledge, but about
why these properties are epistemically good. What matters for this purpose is that these
properties manifest something further—viz., ways to value accuracy.
Here we see what is new. My view captures unappreciated truth-oriented unity in epis-
temic value by its appeal to the Extended Hurka Principle and ways of valuing on accuracy in
thought. These ideas are not familiar in epistemology. Most epistemologists assume without
argument that all derivative value must be grounded instrumentally.
One might try to restate the objection: ‘But if ways to value accuracy are grounded in
familiar properties, then ways to value accuracy will only be epistemically valuable if these
familiar properties are epistemically valuable. But it is your job to explain why these familiar
properties are epistemically valuable!’ I would reply that they are epistemically valuable
because they constitute ways of valuing accuracy, which in turn derive epistemic value via
the Extended Hurka Principle. This sounds question-begging only if we are hoodwinked by
a fallacy. Consider a beautiful painting. It is grounded in a bunch of atoms. These atoms are
not beautiful. If they have value, it is because they ground something else. We should not
insist that the atoms must have antecedent value and worry that the painting is trash because
we cannot find this antecedent value. Their value can be explained in a trickle-down fashion:
they ground the painting and it is valuable, so they are valuable.
4.4 Did We Really Avoid Swamping?
I said Veritists could avoid swamping by appealing to two facts: (i) that manifestations of
ways of valuing valuable properties are themselves non-instrumentally valuable, and (ii) that
this value remains even when the manifestations have the properties that are valued. Thanks
to (i) and (ii), it seems true that if an accurate belief manifests (and in this sense has its source
in) the believer’s valuing of accuracy, the belief is epistemically better.
But is there really a general truth backing this claim? Suppose a painter values beauty,
and for this reason produces a beautiful painting. Does this painting have any extra value
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from the aesthetic point of view, simply in virtue of the fact that it was produced by some-
one who values beauty? This is implausible, one might insist.
Reply. In thinking about this objection, we must be careful to distinguish between mani-
festations of ways of valuing and mere products of ways of valuing.40 The extended Hurka
principle does not say that just any products of fitting ways of valuing have derivative non-
instrumental value, only that manifestations of fitting ways of valuing have such value. Of
course, it is not implausible that some features of an artwork could manifest an artist’s ideals
just like her acts and attitudes do. But the examples that make this thought plausible support
my view. Imagine two novels that appear to have the same stylistic properties. One has
them by accident; it is the work of a hack writer, entirely unaware of the significance of
these properties, and who could easily have written garbage. The other novel was written
by an artist who appreciates the significance of these properties and includes them for this
reason. It is not crazy to claim that the second is a better literary work.
More carefully: it is not crazy to make this claim if we assume that the aesthetic value of a
work isn’t independent of the artistic intention behind it. One might reject that assumption.
But if one does reject that assumption, one is adopting the view that the aesthetic properties
of a work cannot be manifestations of the artist’s ideals: they are mere products of the artist.
Accordingly, to the extent that we share the objector’s intuition about the case above, we
can see that as evidence that it is a case of mere production, not of manifestation. If we
embrace it as a genuine case of manifestation, we should reconsider the objector’s intuition
about her (notably underdescribed) case, given that clear-cut cases of manifestation in the
aesthetic domain elicit an inconsistent intuition. Hence the objection can be answered with
a dilemma: either the case is not a case of manifestation, in which case it doesn’t falsify the
extended Hurka principle, or it is, and we should reject the objector’s intuition on grounds
of consistency with other, clearer examples of manifestation.
It is fair for the opponent of Instrumentalism to emphasize the difference between mani-
festations and mere products. Avoiding Instrumentalism requires an appeal to relations that
are not instrumental. The product of relation is an instrumental relation. It is not surpris-
ing that mere products of valuable sources don’t derive any value. And if we consider clear
manifestations of the artist’s ideals—painterly choices—it is not implausible that they can
derive value. Consider a painter who knows what is beautiful and produces something beau-
tiful deliberately, and another who produces something beautiful only accidentally. The first
painter’s acts are more admirable.
4.5 Does Hurka’s Principle Really Generalize?
While Hurka’s Principle is intuitive for value simpliciter, one might worry that it doesn’t gen-
eralize to insulated domains like epistemology and grammar. Sometimes I hear the following
version of this worry: ‘Suppose I love the rules of grammar. My love has no grammatical
value. Yet doesn’t your generalized version of Hurka’s Principle predict otherwise?’
Reply. This is not a counterexample to the generalized version of Hurka’s Principle. To see
this, let me underline a crucial part of the principle:
When V is a non-instrumental value in some domain, proper ways of valuing V
in that domain have some derivative non-instrumental value.
40This distinction is increasingly popular in the literature on virtue epistemology; see Turri (2011) and Sosa
(2015), who argue that the distinction is crucial for a virtue epistemological solution to the Gettier problem.
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Is it grammatically proper to love the rules of grammar? Not clearly. But if not, the Extended
Hurka Principle does not predict that love for the rules of grammar is grammatically good.
For the principle cannot predict that love for X is valuable in any domain unless it is also
true that love is a proper response to X in that domain. So the antecedent of the Extended
Hurka Principle is not satisfied, and the objectionable conclusion cannot be derived.
One might object that this response is inconsistent with my earlier claim that admiring
the beautiful is good from the aesthetic point of view. But there is, I believe, no inconsistency
here. It is plausible as a substantive claim about the aesthetic domain that there are domain-
relative reasons to have certain pro-attitudes towards the beautiful and the sublime, and
certain con-attitudes towards the ugly. For that reason, I think it is plausible that there is a
domain-relative kind of value that these attitudes have. Just as the fitting attitudes analysis of
value simpliciter says that what is valuable simpliciter is what it is proper to value simpliciter,
so a fitting attitudes analysis of domain-relative value would say that what is valuable from
the point of view of some domain D is what it is proper from the point of view of D to value.
It is left open as a substantive question for particular domains whether there is some rule
in the domain enjoining one to value the values of those domains. Here I believe there are
substantive, though not structural, disanalogies between domains. Some domains that have
rules do not plausibly have values;41 correspondingly, it is less plausible to claim that these
domains contain a rule enjoining one to value anything in the domain. Grammar falls in this
category. In this respect, there is a substantive disanalogy between grammar and aesthetics.
But the Extended Hurka Principle is consistent with these substantive disanalogies: the
antecedent of the principle will just be satisfied for some domains, and not others.
If one dislikes substantive disanalogies, one could repeat the response I gave to the worry
about the initial strangeness of saying that admiring the beautiful is good from the aesthetic
point of view. One could perhaps just accept the claim that loving the rules of grammar is
a good thing from a grammatical point of view. For the purposes of my project, it does not
matter which response we pursue. I am merely describing my preferred response. While it is
more complicated, I believe the complications are appropriate: while I think all normative
domains will exhibit structural analogies, it is not implausible to insist that they might be
substantively different, by containing different domain-specific norms of propriety.
What about the epistemic domain? Respect, commitment, and compliance in my sense
are epistemically proper positive relations to AN. This is a plausible substantive claim about
the epistemic domain, one made plausible by the fact that there are recognizable epistemic
criticisms that we can issue for people who, for example, disrepect the norm of accuracy in
the sense carved out earlier. If so, I can use Hurka’s Principle compatibly with denying that
loving the rules of grammar is grammatically good.
The fact that our principle appeals to domain-relative propriety does not trivialize it.
Instrumentalism is inconsistent with our principle. So, our principle is clearly non-trivial.
Might one insist that “proper” means “valuable” and insist that the principle is circular for
this reason? No. Propriety is a kind of rightness. Rightness and value represent different
species of normativity. There are long-standing debates about how rightness and value are
related. So, Hurka’s Principle is not circular in linking propriety and goodness.
4.6 What About Other Epistemic Values?
One might accept my account of the epistemic value of rationality, justification, and knowl-
edge but worry that the approach cannot stretch farther. How, one might ask, can it explain
41Cf. Foot (1985, p. 34) on etiquette.
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richer epistemic values like understanding, open-mindedness, and intellectual courage?
Reply. While I think my account can accord these properties all the epistemic value they
can reasonably be claimed to have, I should stress first that my burden is lighter than the
objection assumes. My goal has not been to offer a full-dress defense of Veritism, but rather
to show how Veritists can avoid the swamping problem by dropping Instrumentalism. I’ve
argued that Instrumentalism, not Veritism, is the root of the problem. If this is true, there
is not clearly a stronger reason to think the Veritist cannot explain the epistemic value of
understanding or open-mindedness than to think other monist axiologists (e.g., knowledge-
firsters) or moderate pluralist axiologists cannot. It cannot be taken as a datum that under-
standing, open-mindedness, and intellectual courage are fundamentally epistemically valu-
able. Since the Veritist can solve the swamping problem, there is no obvious burden she
faces that many other monists and moderate pluralists don’t face.
Still, one might like a more direct response. I’ll offer a two-pronged one. First, I think
these rich properties have a special glow partly by having extra value that is not properly
epistemic. Beliefs that exhibit these properties may still be epistemically better than mere
true beliefs. But—second prong—my framework can explain their properly epistemic value.
As a warm-up to the first prong, note that epistemic axiologists often try to explain too
much by not distinguishing two things we could mean by ‘epistemic value’. Just as Geach
(1956) distinguished between attributive and predicative goodness, we should separate
(a) being epistemically good
from
(b) being good simpliciter and also being epistemic.
There are parallels. Consider talk of a good chess strategy. This may pick out
(c) something that is good from the point of view of chess strategy
or
(d) something that is good simpliciter and also a chess strategy.
If your chess strategy will humiliate your opponent, it exemplifies (c) but not (d). Similarly,
something might be epistemically superb but of little worth absolutely.
Must the chess expert explain the goodness of chess strategies from the Point of View of
the Universe? No. It is similarly hard to see why the epistemologist must explain which epis-
temic items matter from that point of view. Intuitions voiced in the literature on epistemic
value often conflate (a) and (b).42 But intuitions about (b) are best left for non-epistemic
axiologists to explain. A theory of what is valuable from the epistemic point of view need
not explain them, just as the chess strategist need not vindicate chess fanaticism.
With this point in mind, I approach the richer properties the objector mentions with
some suspicion. Let’s take understanding first. While understanding might contribute espe-
cially to our flourishing and we do seem to value it as an end simpliciter, it is less obvious
42The original Meno problem seemed to concern the value simpliciter of knowledge, and some contemporary
writers, like Kvanvig (2003), take this to be the central problem. Ridge (2013) compellingly argues that there is
a widespread and detrimental conflation of attributive and predicative value in the literature.
27
why it should have premium significance from the epistemic point of view. Understand-
ing does have considerable epistemic value. But Veritism can explain this intuition. Like
Pritchard (2010, pp. 75–6), I think one cannot understand a topic without having many
rational true beliefs about it, where these beliefs have a special subject matter (i.e., they
concern explanatory connections). So understanding will have all the epistemic value that
accompanies those many rational true beliefs. Moreover, this value is distinctive in the sense
that its subject matter is distinctive. So it is compatible with my view that understanding
can have great, even distinctive, epistemic value. I doubt there are any stronger clear-cut
intuitions about the properly epistemic value of understanding. To defend this doubt, let’s
reflect on some relevant facts about attributive value.
A member M of a kind K has more attributive value than another member M* of K
when M is a better K, or is better qua K, than M*. And it is trivial that if M is a better K (or
is better qua K) than M*, M* is a worse K (or is worse qua K) than M. So, we should ask:
(Q) If S’s beliefs Bi constitute less understanding than S*’s beliefs B* j , is it necessarily the
case that Bi are worse qua beliefs than B* j?
I don’t see that our answer to (Q) must be ‘yes’. We may hope to understand the world.
But it may be unintelligible. A cognizer’s world could turn out to be a bag of loose facts, as
in a Humean disaster scenario. If Alf’s world does turn out to be a bag of loose facts, Alf’s
beliefs cannot reasonably be regarded as flawed in comparison with those of someone—say,
Ralf—in a more orderly world, simply on the grounds that while Ralf grasps connections
there to be grasped, Alf grasps no such connections. The problem in Alf’s case lies not in his
beliefs, but in the world. This contrasts with our attitude towards beliefs that are radically
inaccurate, irrational, unjustified, incompetent, and so on. A belief is always in one respect
worse as a belief if it is irrational, unjustified, incompetent, or so on.
In saying that the problem in Alf’s case is with the world, not his beliefs, I am not
saying that that whether a belief is flawed qua belief cannot turn on how the world turns
out. False beliefs are worse qua beliefs. But we can do something about beliefs that fail
to match the world, just like we can with beliefs that are irrational, unjustified, or so on:
we can revise them. Inhabitants of Alf’s world cannot do anything about their lack of
worldly understanding. So if their beliefs are in all other respects epistemically flawless, it
is implausible to claim that they are still worse in the attributive sense than the beliefs of
epistemically perfect denizens of Ralf’s world.
So I see no straightforward challenge from the value of understanding, provided we fo-
cus on the relative attributive value of cognitive states that exhibit and fail to exhibit this
property. Again, this is not to deny that there is often more epistemic value in a set of
beliefs that exhibits understanding when the believer is confronting a world that can be un-
derstood. But Veritism can explain this surplus epistemic value, I suggested. Perhaps there
is a further intuition that it is better to know connections than simply to know facts, and
that a piece of knowledge about a connection between two facts is better than a piece of
knowledge about three loose and separate facts. But this intuition is only vivid when ‘better’
is left unqualified. I don’t see that it is necessary to explain this intuition by appealing to a
difference in properly epistemic value. More plausibly, human beings just assign greater final
value simpliciter to truths about connections than to mere truths.43
43But whatever might be said about the properly epistemic value of beliefs about connections, mightn’t it
be claimed that a theory is better qua theory if it has systematic unity? And that is a clear intuition about the
attributive value of some broadly epistemic item, isn’t it?
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Let’s turn now to open-mindedness, to which similar reasoning applies. Baehr (2012)
walks through several characterizations of open-mindedness. The initial accounts he consid-
ers have a social dimension, and include evaluative terms with an ethical flavor, like ‘fair’,
‘impartial’, and ‘honest’. One account views the open-minded thinker as someone who gives
‘a fair and impartial hearing to an opposing belief, argument, or body of evidence’, while
another views the open-minded subject as someone who assesses ‘one or more sides of an
intellectual dispute in a fair and impartial way’ (Baehr 2012, pp. 143–145). While Baehr ob-
serves that there are limits to the sociality of openmindedness,44 his final account retains the
ethical flavor of earlier accounts. He characterizes all open-minded thinkers as willing to give
distinct cognitive standpoints ‘a ‘serious’ (i.e., fair, honest, objective) hearing or assessment’
(Baehr 2012, pp. 151–152).
It seems clear that part of what is praiseworthy about open-minded agents is that they
manifest an ethical virtue, though it is an ethical virtue of thought and an intellectual virtue in
the predicative sense. While a Veritist cannot explain this value, she shouldn’t be expected to
do so. Open-mindedness has some properly epistemic merit. But Veritists face no difficulty
explaining this merit. Baehr’s own partial account of when it is epistemically appropriate to
manifest open-mindedness is close to my account of what it is to manifest respect for accu-
racy. Baehr tells us that it is appropriate from the epistemic point of view for S to manifest
open-mindedness ‘only if it is reasonable for S to believe that engaging in this activity in C
may be helpful for reaching the truth’ (Baehr 2012, p. 160). While I would rephrase this
condition to say ‘only if S’s seeming evidence suggests that engaging in this activity would
likely be in conformity with AN’, the difference is slight. Both are consistent with Veritism.
I am more skeptical about intellectual courage. Baehr defines intellectual courage as a dis-
position to persist in aiming at some epistemic good ‘despite the fact that doing so involves
an apparent threat to one’s own well-being’ (Baehr 2012, p. 177). I don’t see the relevance
to properly epistemic praise of the fact that one’s persistence in aiming at some epistemic
good is done in spite of a threat to one’s well-being. Once again, we must distinguish be-
tween epistemic virtues in a predicative sense and epistemic virtues in an attributive sense.
Epistemic axiology concerns the latter. Intellectual courage isn’t a clear example of the latter.
Accordingly, I think my view attributes to understanding, open-mindedness, and intel-
lectual courage all the properly epistemic value that can reasonably be attributed to them.
While these are not the only epistemic values other than coherence, rationality, justification,
and knowledge, they are commonly mentioned as challenging Veritism.45 I see no obvious
threat to my strategy for solving the swamping problem if we go beyond a conservative list
I don’t find it plausible that systematic unity is a virtue of a theory qua theory when it doesn’t reflect corre-
sponding unity in the world. It might be a virtue of the theory qua literary object, but this is irrelevant. While
it is fair to worry that the emphasis on cognitive states is too narrow, some narrowness is needed. There are
many more precise representational activities with constitutive standards that don’t extend to representation as
such. One map is better than another qua map in virtue of being more helpful for understanding how to get
from A to B, for any A and B on the map, but it does not follow that representations in general are better qua
representations if they satisfy this desideratum. In constructing a scientific theory, we are trying to grasp the
causal structure of reality, but scientific theorizing is for that reason not just representation. Just as satisfying the
specific cognitive desires that maps isn’t necessarily a value of a representation qua representation, so systematic
unity isn’t necessarily a value of representation qua representation.
44Summarizing, Baehr writes: ‘[D]espite the initial plausibility of such a view, open-mindedness cannot be
identified with a disposition to set aside one’s beliefs about a particular issue in order to consider some opposing
viewpoint or piece of evidence (the conflict model). This is because open-mindedness can be exhibited by
individuals that are neutral or undecided about the views or arguments they are considering. Second, we have
seen that neither is open-mindedness essentially a matter of making a fair or impartial assessment of one or more
sides of a dispute...[, since] it can bear on situations in which there is no disagreement...’ (Baehr 2012, p.148).
45See, e.g., Axtell and Carter (2008), Carter and Gordon (2014), Kvanvig (2003), and Pritchard (2010).
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of epistemic values, provided we focus on the attributive value of that larger list’s contents.
5 But Isn’t There a Less Radical Solution?
I’ve displayed the advantages of my solution and answered a host of objections. But even if a
solution has many advantages and overcomes direct objections, it is only worthy of pursuit
if there aren’t less radical solutions. Some might insist that we needn’t go to such lengths to
solve the swamping problem, and that perhaps we can solve it while retaining Instrumental-
ism. Virtue epistemology (VE) is salient at this point. Some virtue epistemologists might
argue that they have already solved the swamping problem in a way that is consistent with
Instrumentalist Veritism. If so, we needn’t bother with the measures I’ve recommended.
This response, I will now argue, is mistaken. VE either fails to solve the swamping
problem or succeeds only because it collapses into my approach. In defending this claim,
I’ll show that any version of reliabilist VE that holds onto Instrumentalism cannot solve
the swamping problem. Reliabilist VE can only plausibly solve the swamping problem if
reliabilist virtues can be seen as constituting something more than mere instruments of
truth-promotion: namely, ways of valuing accuracy. While responsibilist VE fares better
in solving the swamping problem, it isn’t a genuine alternative to my view: as I suggest
below and argue at length elsewhere,46 my view can be regarded as a form of responsibilism.
5.1 A Dilemma for Reliabilist VE
Reliabilist VE is the version of VE that is most plausibly consistent with Instrumentalist
Veritism.47 On this view, beliefs gain epistemic value by manifesting an epistemic agent’s
competence. While competence here is reliabilist, it is also agent-level in a way reliable pro-
cesses need not be. Owing to this difference, Sosa’s model makes a narrower prediction than
the process reliabilist’s: only beliefs that manifest the agent’s epistemic competence gain ex-
tra epistemic worth. This can seem to give Sosa a more principled response to the swamping
problem. Apt belief is an achievement, while products of reliable processes needn’t be.
Compare this with my view. On my view, beliefs gain epistemic worth by manifesting
certain ways of valuing accuracy in thought. Structurally, the views are similar: in both cases,
the belief derives epistemic worth by manifesting a truth-connected person-level feature.
Substantively, they apparently differ: the feature is a reliabilist competence in one case, and a
way of valuing accuracy in thought in the other. But one might think Sosa has the advantage,
since his feature sounds less lofty. So why prefer my solution?
I have two responses. First, this question rests partly on a false dilemma. I would view
some kinds of competent belief as constituting ways to value accuracy in thought. Since I do
not understand ways of valuing accuracy in thought in a demanding way, there is no divide
between Sosa and me here. The difference rests not in the demands we make, but in our
views of derivative epistemic value. On my view, it is only because some competences con-
stitute ways to value accuracy in thought that their manifestations have derivative epistemic
46See Sylvan (forthcoming).
47Sosa (2007, Ch. 4) is naturally read as trying to reconcile Instrumentalist Veritism with the claim that
knowledge is epistemically better than true belief. Sosa doesn’t use the terms ‘Instrumentalism’ or ‘Veritism’, but
he does identify himself as a ‘truth-centered’ epistemologist, and describes truth-centered epistemology in much
the way I’ve described Instrumentalist Veritism. While he distances himself from the claim that all derivative
value is instrumental value, this is because he is using ‘instrumental’ more narrowly to refer to production value,
not product value.
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value. Sosa explains why manifestations of competence have epistemic value without regard
to whether they constitute ways to value accuracy in thought.
This brings me to the second response. It is crucial for the success of VE that compe-
tences be able to ground ways of valuing accuracy in thought. We can see this by seeing
why Sosa’s picture leaves us with no convincing way to understand the difference in epis-
temic worth between the first-order beliefs of reliable clairvoyants and those of (e.g.) sighted
children. While Sosa’s view has some advantages over other reliabilist views, the advantages
are axiologically insufficient. Perhaps reliable clairvoyants have animal knowledge. The
question is whether Sosa can explain the difference in epistemic worth between a reliable
clairvoyant’s first-order beliefs and those of sighted children. We will see that Sosa’s ani-
mal/reflective distinction does not help: there is a first-order difference.48
Sosa could revise his account of first-order competence in a way that John Greco has
recommended. But the revision is attractive because it turns competences into the sorts of
things that plausibly ground ways of valuing accuracy. The revision is not motivated unless
viewed as conceding that the reliabilist part of the view does not do the axiological work.
So, there is a dilemma: this form of VE either (i) is lacking in explanatory power or (ii)
collapses into my view.
5.2 First Horn
Competences for Sosa are reliable belief-forming dispositions, relative to favorable condi-
tions in the actual world. This account predicts symmetry between the first-order beliefs of
reliable clairvoyants and the first-order beliefs of sighted subjects. Their beliefs can equally
manifest Sosan competence. If the facts of epistemic value are explained by such compe-
tences, the first-order doxastic attitudes of reliable clairvoyants must be equal in epistemic
value to the parallel attitudes of sighted perceivers.
But even if we agree that the doxastic attitudes of reliable clairvoyants have some epis-
temic worth, it is implausible that the degree is the same. Wemight agree that the clairvoyant
knows. We are doing epistemic axiology now. Our objection is just as well expressed as one
about the difference in epistemic worth between two instances of knowledge.
Some reliabilists try to deem the clairvoyant incompetent by adding a ‘no defeaters’
clause. But the best versions of this strategy count as defeaters factors that should look
irrelevant from a purely reliabilist perspective—e.g., mere beliefs and appearances.49 Like
48Mark well that I am not denying that the reliable clairvoyant’s beliefs have some epistemic worth, but just
that saying they have less worth than the first-order beliefs of (e.g.) sighted children. Given that I am using
‘valuing’ in a very broad sense, it would be hard for me to deny that reliable clairvoyants might manifest some
minimal way of valuing accuracy in thought, even if they fail to manifest many other ways (e.g., respect). I see
no need to deny that their beliefs might have some Hurkan epistemic value. Nonetheless, my view easily allows
me to discriminate between the relative epistemic worth of their beliefs and those of sighted children: sighted
children manifest more ways of valuing accuracy in thought, and also manifest more fitting ways of valuing
accuracy in thought, than reliable clairvoyants. The objection I’m pressing against Sosa is not that his view
wrongly predicts that the reliable clairvoyant’s beliefs have some epistemic worth when they have none, but
rather that granting Instrumentalism, it fails to explain why their beliefs could have less epistemic worth than
the beliefs of sighted children.
49Some reliabilist accounts of defeat are supposed to address reliable clairvoyance. But they encounter troubles
in modified cases. Consider the alternative reliable process account of defeat. On this account, having a defeater
for one’s belief that p consists in having available to one an alternative reliable process that, if used in addition to
or instead of the one actually used, would have led to one’s not believing p. Goldman suggests that this addresses
Norman the clairvoyant, claiming that Norman could reliably reason as follows: ‘If I had a clairvoyant power,
I should surely find some evidence for this. Since I lack any such evidence, I apparently have no such power’
(Goldman 1986, p. 112). As Lyons observes, this doesn’t go far enough: ‘[I]t is not difficult to modify the
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Greco, I find this unprincipled: ‘Reliabilism insists on a reliabilist account of evidence in
favor of belief. . . . [H]ow can the same theory plausibly understand evidence against belief
differently? Such a strategy seems at best ad hoc’ Greco (2009, pp. 158–9).
Sosa’s tack differs.50 He thinks reliable clairvoyants might have animal knowledge and
holds that what they lack is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is understood as apt
belief that one aptly believes, where aptness is understood in the same externalist way at
both orders. What clairvoyants lack is an externalistically parsed grasp of the status of their
first-order beliefs. This gives Sosa’s explanation more unity than the defeat strategy.
But the explanation falls short axiologically. Consider a child seeing a red apple on the
table in good light and then judging that there is a red apple on the table. This child might
lack the conceptual resources to form a belief about the propriety of her first-order belief.
Indeed, she might lack the mental state concept BELIEF and the ability to engage in any
second-order reflection. Nevertheless, her perceptual beliefs about the apple are epistem-
ically worthier than those of the clairvoyant 400 miles away who equally reliably forms
beliefs about the child’s surroundings. This difference is not at the reflective level.
Some might bite the bullet, claiming that the child’s beliefs are on a par with the clair-
voyant’s. But the reply is costly, and it underestimates the problem. Many adults lack much
of a reflective stance on their perceptual beliefs and so have little reflective perceptual knowl-
edge. The fact that some are in a position to gain reflective knowledge is irrelevant. By
analogy: suppose I believe something for bad reasons, though I am in a position to believe
for good reasons. That I can do better is irrelevant to the quality of my actual beliefs. The
real difference is not second-order. The story should come at the first order.
5.3 Second Horn
John Greco has proposed an enriched account of first-order competence. But his proposal
faces his own objections to liberal defeat strategies unless his view is understood as a version
of my view. To see this, consider the details. Greco first suggests that we analyze epis-
temic responsibility in terms of the intellectual dispositions that one manifests when one is
motivated to believe the truth:
S’s belief that p is epistemically responsible if and only if S’s believing that p is properly moti-
vated; if and only if S’s believing that p results from intellectual dispositions that S manifests
when S is motivated to believe the truth. (Greco 2010, p. 43)
He then analyzes epistemic virtue in terms of reliability and epistemic responsibility:
S’s belief that p is epistemically virtuous if and only if both (a) S’s belief that p is epistemically
responsible; and (b) S is objectively reliable in believing that p. (Greco 2010, p. 43)
The unjustified but reliable clairvoyant, Greco suggests, fails condition (a).
But Greco’s explanation confronts his own objection to the reliabilist’s appeal to an un-
reliabilist kind of defeat. Greco insists that reliabilists cannot treat positive and negative
justification-relevant properties differently without a unified explanation of why both mat-
ter. He faces a similar question. He says that epistemic responsibility is a virtue. But we
must ask him why. What unified story can deem both objective reliability and motivation
counterexample so that it precludes such a reply. We can just stipulate that Norman is so bad at reasoning about
such matters that there is no [alternative] process that is both reliable and available to him. This doesn’t seem to
change the intuitive verdict’ (Lyons 2009, p. 124).
50I rely on Sosa (1991)’s discussion of clairvoyance. Since then he hasn’t explicitly discussed it.
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to believe the truth as epistemic virtues? Greco offers no answer. By contrast, my view
provides a simple explanation of why being motivated to believe the truth is epistemically
virtuous. It is a way to value accuracy in thought, and it matters from the epistemic point
of view via the Extended Hurka Principle. This confirms my prediction of convergence.
Indeed, there is not just convergence but collapse. For the best explanation of why the
dispositions constitutive of being motivated to believe the truth are epistemically virtuous
is that they ground ways of valuing accuracy. There is no general reliabilist explanation. If
there were, there would have been no need to revise the account! Thus the second horn:
revising the account of first-order epistemic virtue is principled only if underpinned by a
view of epistemic virtue like mine. So, reliabilist VE either can’t explain all facts about
epistemic value or collapses into my view.
5.4 About Responsibilism
Of course, reliabilist VE is not the only kind of VE. There is also the responsibilist tradition.
While I think others have revealed serious problems for standard forms of responsibilist
VE,51 I’ve also argued elsewhere that these objections can be overcome if responsibilists
drop their emphasis on character traits.52 But even if responsibilism is defensible, this fact
would not undermine the main point I’ve been making in this section. For one thing, the
traditional version of responsibilist VE is perfectly consistent with my approach, and indeed
fares better than reliabilist VE precisely because, on this version, virtues plausibly constitute
epistemically proper ways of valuing epistemic value. For another thing, what I’ve elsewhere
recommended as an alternative to the traditional version is an approach whose picture of
the virtues directly aligns with the Hurka-inspired approach taken here. Developed in this
way, responsibilist VE coincides with the view offered above, and couldn’t be seen as an
alternative. While the label doesn’t matter much to me, I would be happy to see my view as
coinciding with the best version of responsibilism, not an alternative to it.
6 Conclusion
Let’s take stock. I argued that Veritists can and should reject Instrumentalism. This is the
moral of the swamping problem. We can see that it is by seeing that if Instrumentalism were
true, the points that led to the swamping problem would create related problems for other
economical epistemic axiologies. This shouldn’t convince us that a radical pluralism about
fundamental epistemic value is true. It should convince us that Instrumentalism is false.
I showed that Veritism is defensible against the swamping problem and related problems
if we reject Instrumentalism. As we saw in §2, the derivative value generated by Hurka’s
Principle is swamping-proof. A beneficent act that manifests the agent’s valuing of benefi-
cence is as such better than a similar act performed as a PR stunt. This is plausible despite
the fact that the goodness of valuing beneficence is parasitic on the goodness of beneficence.
51The traditional version—‘strong conservative’ responsibilism, as Baehr (2012) calls it—has encountered
many objections in recent years. Critics like Alfano (2012), Baehr (2012), and Dougherty (2011) have argued that
knowledge, justified belief, and rational belief do not require the manifestation of stable character traits, as exist-
ing versions of strong conservative responsibilism demand. Yet if responsibilism is made less ambitious—taking
a ‘weak conservative’ or ‘autonomous’ form—it cannot provide a satisfactory account of the epistemic value
of rationality, justification, and knowledge. For if virtues are character traits and rationality, justification and
knowledge don’t require manifestation of such traits, it is unclear why these properties necessarily have any
value as such from the epistemic point of view.
52See Sylvan (forthcoming).
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This fact would be useless if we couldn’t relevantly employ Hurka’s Principle in the epis-
temic domain. But we can. Central epistemic values like coherence, rationality, justification,
and knowledge essentially manifest certain ways to value accuracy in thought. None of this
is an overintellectualization. To think otherwise is to implicitly overintellectualize the mod-
est business of valuing accuracy in thought. It is natural to fault subjects for failing to place
sufficient value on accuracy in thought, and plausible that people who disregard the evidence
are open to criticism because they fail to place sufficient value on accuracy in thought.
So, there is a way for Veritists to avoid the swamping problem and provide explanations
of the epistemic value of central epistemic properties like rationality and knowledge. Since
it is antecedently attractive to think that epistemic evaluation is truth-oriented, I think we
should continue to be attracted to Veritism.
Of course, as I’ve stressed throughout, my aim has not been to give a conclusive defense
of Veritism, but rather a defense from the swamping problem and attendant problems. An
exhaustive argument for Veritism would require showing that it is preferable to all other
ecnonomical epistemic axiologies, and that it can explain the epistemic value of anything
that might be thrown at it. But while it was beyond the scope of this paper to offer such
a comprehensive defense, I do think the central ideas in this paper further aid this more
ambitious project. I will conclude by briefly explaining why, beginning with a comparison
with other economical epistemic axiologies.
As we saw earlier, no modest pluralism about fundamental epistemic value that clings
to Instrumentalism can avoid every relative of the swamping problem. With Instrumental-
ism dropped, there is no swamping-related reason to prefer these forms of pluralism. Since
parsimony is a virtue, we have reason to prefer my view to these views. As we’ve also seen,
other forms of monism that preserve Instrumentalism will face relatives of the swamping
problem. If the desire to avoid swamping attracts one to a knowledge-first epistemic axiol-
ogy, one is short-sighted: this view faces related problems, as I argued earlier. Of course,
one could embrace a non-Veritist monism while also rejecting Instrumentalism. Because I
am optimistic about the analyzability of knowledge, I doubt that the main alternative—i.e.,
the knowledge-first view—is well-motivated. With such motivations set aside, I see no clear
reason to think that non-traditional monisms will outperform my more traditional monism.
But this is not the place to argue against the knowledge-first program. Here I claim only that
it offers no clear axiological advantage that isn’t matched by an advantage of my view.
More radical pluralists might claim that there is such a rich variety of epistemic values
that it is a priori implausible to expect any economical axiology to succeed. Or they might
insist that it is clear that we do value, say, knowledge, understanding, rationality, etc., for
their own sake. But my Non-Instrumentalist Veritism offers the intuitive satisfaction that
more radical pluralist views offer without losses in unity and simplicity. For it is consistent
with my view that there are indefinitely many non-instrumental or final epistemic values.53
Accordingly, it is consistent with my view that in one sense of ‘for their own sake’, we
properly value many epistemic properties ‘for their own sake’ (i.e., not as mere means). But
as I’ve shown, it is consistent with embracing a richly pluralist inventory of final epistemic
values to think that there is just one fundamental epistemic value. For if derivativeness
doesn’t imply instrumentality, then non-instrumentality also doesn’t imply fundamentality.
Finally, it is worth re-emphasizing that it is consistent with my view that any number
of epistemic properties might be finally valuable simpliciter. As I’ve emphasized, we should
distinguish being valuable and epistemic from being epistemically valuable, and as epistemic
53In accordance with the etymology (‘finis’ in Latin means end), I assume that ‘final’ means as an end, not
merely a means, and hence that final value and non-instrumental value are the same thing.
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axiologists confine our attention to the latter. And I believe the response I gave to some
other example-based challenges to Veritism in §4.6 will extend to more exotic epistemic
properties that might be mentioned, such as intellectual honesty, intellectual perseverance,
epistemic justice, contemplativeness, and so on. Admittedly, given that the early literature
on epistemic value was concerned with the Meno problem and it is far from clear that this
is simply a problem about attributive epistemic value, this focus might be narrower than
that of some earlier literature. But I don’t see that epistemologists will be particularly well-
equipped to adjudicate monism/pluralism debates in this wider arena. So I think my line is
the most ambitious that could reasonably be expected in an epistemology paper such as this.
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